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REVISITING UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: THE 
APPLICATION OF THE COMPLEMENTARITY PRINCIPLE 
BY NATIONAL COURTS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR EX-POST 
JUSTICE IN THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR 
Hilly Moodrick-Even Khen∗ 
ABSTRACT 
In this Article, I revisit the concept of universal jurisdiction in making a 
case for the application of mitigated universal jurisdiction in general and in 
the Syrian civil war case in particular, through the jurisdiction of sovereign 
states and their national courts. I argue that the international community will 
sooner or later demand that the perpetrators of the heinous war crimes and 
crimes against humanity be held accountable. However, since the jurisdiction 
of the International Criminal Court (ICC) will probably be impeded by the 
United Nations Security Council’s veto, the international community might use 
another trajectory for prosecuting the perpetrators of the alleged crimes. One 
possibility is to rely on the principle of universal jurisdiction, in its mitigated 
form, according to which Syrian leaders can be prosecuted under the 
jurisdictions of foreign states. 
I claim that mitigated universal jurisdiction, dependent mainly on its 
subordination to the principle of complementarity (also referred to as 
“subsidiarity” in the national legislation of some states), is still the best legal 
tool for doing ex-post facto justice with perpetrators of international core 
crimes in general and in the Syrian case in particular. This conclusion results 
from an analysis of Syrian society in Part IV, which reveals that the chances 
are high that post-conflict Syrian society would have great difficulty 
undertaking the legal trials of perpetrators of international core crimes in 
good faith. Therefore, universal jurisdiction could serve as a practical tool for 
prosecuting those perpetrators of crimes in other states. 
 
 ∗ Dr., Senior Lecturer of public international law in The Academic Center of Law and Science, Israel; 
LL.D, Hebrew University of Jerusalem (2007); M.A. in philosophy, magna cum laude, Tel Aviv University 
(2001), LL.B, The Interdisciplinary Center of Herzliya (2000); B.A. in humanities, Hebrew University of 
Jerusalem (1996). The author would like to thank the members of the editorial board of Emory International 
Law Review for their valuable comments on earlier drafts of this Article.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Since March 2011, Syria has been experiencing a devastating civil war,1 
which began as civil demonstrations for a democratic and liberal Syria2 and 
deteriorated into a bloody armed conflict.3 During this conflict, numerous war 
crimes and crimes against humanity have been perpetrated by both the 
regime’s army (mainly the shabbiha, the Syrian security forces) and the troops 
of the various rebel groups.4 The crimes include murder, torture, violence 
against civilians, and even the use of chemical weapons.5 Sooner or later, the 
international community will demand that the perpetrators of these crimes be 
held accountable; however, an initiative to try President al-Assad at the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) was vetoed by Russia and China in the 
United Nations (U.N.) Security Council.6 It seems, then, that the international 
community might use another trajectory for prosecuting the perpetrators of the 
alleged crimes. One possibility is to rely on the principle of universal 
jurisdiction, according to which Syrian leaders7 can be prosecuted under the 
jurisdictions of foreign states. This principle would also work to pressure post-
war Syrian society into prosecuting those responsible for committing 
international core crimes in its own courts—because if Syria fails to do so, it 
knows that other states will.8 
 
 1 Also referred to as “the Syrian uprising,” “the Syrian rebellion,” and in legal terms, a non-international 
armed conflict. In this Article it will be referred to as “the uprising” or “the war.” 
 2 See FOUAD AJAMI, THE SYRIAN REBELLION xv (2012); Salwa Ismail, The Syrian Uprising: Imagining 
and Performing the Nation, 11 STUD. ETHNICITY & NATIONALISM 538, 539 (2011); Emma Lungren-Jörum, 
Discourse of a Revolution: Framing the Syrian Uprising, 3 ORTAGOĞU ETÜTLERI 9, 11 (2012). 
 3 Numerous reports of bodies of the United Nations appointed to investigate human rights violations in 
Syria review this deterioration. See, e.g., United Nations Mission to Investigate Allegations of the Use of 
Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic, Rep. on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta 
Area of Damascus, U.N. Doc. A/67/997-S/2013/553 (2013) [hereinafter Ghouta Report]; Human Rights 
Council, Report of the Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/50 
(Aug. 16, 2012) [hereinafter Indep. Int’l Comm’n Syrian Report 2012]; Human Rights Council, Report of the 
Indep. Int’l Comm’n of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/65 (Feb. 12, 2014) 
[hereinafter Indep. Int’l Comm’n Syrian Report 2014]. 
 4 Indep. Int’l Comm’n Syrian Report 2012, supra note 3, at 16. 
 5 Ghouta Report, supra note 3, at 2–3. 
 6 Rep. of the S.C., at 2–3, U.N. Doc. A/68/663 (2014).  
 7 I refer here both to those serving in President Al-Assad’s regime and to those responsible for 
international crimes among the dissident armed groups in Syria.  
 8 This claim in particular and the overall analysis made in this Article in general rest on the assumption 
that the conflict will not render a complete dissolution of the Syrian state. Nevertheless, it is of course possible 
that the current developments on the ground, such as the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant, will render changes in the political order or even dissolution of the Syrian state. For arguments 
supporting the assumption that Syria will not dissolve, see AJAMI, supra note 2, at 184–87.  
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In this Article, I revisit the concept of universal jurisdiction in making a 
case for the application of mitigated universal jurisdiction through the 
jurisdiction of sovereign states and their national courts.9 I claim that mitigated 
universal jurisdiction, dependent mainly on its subordination to the principle of 
complementarity (also referred to as “subsidiarity” in the national legislation of 
some states), is still the best legal tool for doing ex-post facto justice with 
perpetrators of international core crimes—genocide, war crimes, and crimes 
against humanity—and apply my conclusions to the Syrian case. 
Following this introduction, in Part I, I present and analyze the concept of 
mitigated universal jurisdiction. After a brief review of the rationale of 
universal jurisdiction, I focus on the justifications for its mitigated version. I 
claim that this concept has been accepted by the ICC and states that have 
incorporated universal jurisdiction into their national legislation because, as 
numerous scholars have argued, it addresses several interests: on the one hand, 
it prevents impunity and ensures due process of law; on the other, it secures the 
interests of reformed societies in their transition to democracy. It also serves to 
protect the rights of the accused and prevent their persecution by their own 
nation states, provided that the preconditioning of universal jurisdiction on the 
principle of subsidiarity is in itself limited by several parameters that ensure 
the legal procedure is executed in good faith. 
In Part II, I explain why the concept of universal jurisdiction applied by the 
national courts, and not only by the ICC, is still relevant. I focus on situations 
in which the ICC cannot or would not interfere, and suggest that in these cases 
universal jurisdiction may be applicable by the national courts of sovereign 
states. 
In Part III, due to the fact that both the ICC and national courts consider 
themselves “courts of second resort,” I discuss in depth the principle of 
complementarity, which serves as the cornerstone for the application of 
mitigated universal jurisdiction. I first examine this principle’s development 
under the ICC’s jurisdiction, as this principle was first formed by the Rome 
Statute and applied and interpreted by this court. Then, I review the principle’s 
application and interpretation in national courts, where it is mostly referred to 
as the principle of subsidiarity.10 
 
 9 This is true regardless of its possible application by the ICC or other international courts or tribunals.  
 10 In Part III, I argue that the terms “complementarity’” and “subsidiarity” may be used interchangeably. 
I also explain in this Part why I prefer to use “complementarity.” However, because “subsidiarity” is the term 
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In Part IV, I discuss the Syrian case. First, I provide a historical 
background of Syrian society, beginning with the establishment of the Syrian 
state through the French Mandate and continuing through the development of 
the Syrian state to the eruption of the 2011 uprising. I will focus here on the 
different sectarian, regional, and tribal loyalties within this society. By 
contrasting the cohesion of Syrian society with its factionalism, I will assess 
the potential ability and willingness of the Syrian society to conduct trials of 
war crime perpetrators in Syria. In this way, I examine the possible 
ramifications of this Article’s analysis for the Syrian case. I argue that given 
the specific circumstances in Syria, the chances are high that post-conflict 
Syrian society would have great difficulty undertaking the legal trials of 
perpetrators of international core crimes in good faith. Therefore, universal 
jurisdiction could serve as a practical tool for prosecuting those perpetrators of 
crimes in other states. In the final section I present my conclusions. 
I. MITIGATED UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 
While the concept of universal jurisdiction is controversial, as will be 
shown in the following subsection, the concept of universal jurisdiction 
mitigated by the principle of complementarity (subsidiarity) that I promulgate 
in this Article is more prevalent and prompts fewer objections. Before 
exploring the core elements of this concept and describing its application by 
national courts and states’ legislation, I will quickly review the unlimited 
version of this concept and refer to some of the concerns raised against it. 
A. The Controversy Over the Concept of Universal Jurisdiction 
 According to customary international law, universal jurisdiction is one of 
the generally accepted bases on which a state may assert extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.11 Universal jurisdiction is based on the universality principle, 
 
used by most domestic jurisdictions, I will use it in Part III, in which I discuss the application of this principle 
by domestic jurisdictions.  
 11 For an overview of the core international law instruments that pronounce this view, see generally Case 
Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 
¶ 60 (Feb. 14); Institut de Droit Int’l, Resolution on Universal Criminal Jurisdiction with Regard to the Crime 
of Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, and War Crimes, Aug. 26, 2005, http://www.justitiaetpace.org/idiE/ 
resolutionsE/2005_kra_03_en.pdf [hereinafter IDI Resolution]; Int’l Law Comm., Draft Code of Crimes 
Against Humanity and the Peace and Security of Mankind, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.532 (1996); STEPHEN 
MACEDO, THE PRINCETON PRINCIPLES ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION (2011). See also Danielle Ireland-Piper, 
Extraterritorial Criminal Jurisdiction: Does the Long Arms of the Law Undermine the Rule of Law?, 13 
MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 122, 130 (2012). 
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defined by Ian Brownlie as a principle adopted by “[a] considerable number of 
states . . . usually with limitations . . . allowing jurisdiction over acts of non-
nationals where the circumstances, including the nature of the crime, justify the 
repression of some types of crime as a matter of international public policy.” 12 
Another important aspect of universal jurisdiction is a very narrow, or even the 
lack of a specific, self-interest that should be protected by the state asserting 
universal jurisdiction13—in other words, when the offenses over which 
jurisdiction is exerted “are not deemed to constitute threats to the fundamental 
interests of the prescribing state, or, in appropriate cases, to give rise to effects 
within its territory.”14 
Nevertheless, universal jurisdiction is a widely debated doctrine in 
international law.15 This is most evident in the fact that states have not yet 
signed a general treaty on the doctrine of universal jurisdiction, nor have they 
agreed on written standards for its application.16 Indeed, the international 
community has set some international legal foundations through the adoption 
of a considerable number of multilateral treaties dealing with international 
crimes (such as slave trade, slavery and forced labor, war crimes, drugs and 
terrorism) that demand the prosecution or extradition of the perpetrators,17 as 
well as through resolutions of intergovernmental bodies,18 official drafts, and 
studies.19 In addition, and mainly in the last decade, states have legislated laws 
that endow them with the right for universal jurisdiction.20 Lastly, universal 
jurisdiction is the legal principle at the foundation of international courts and 
 
 12 IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 303 (6th ed. 2003).  
 13 LUC REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION 5 (2003) (presenting research on states that apply universal 
jurisdiction).  
 14 Roger O’Keefe, Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 735, 745 
(2004). 
 15 See infra notes 24, 25, 27, 28 and accompanying text.  
 16 Claus Kreβ, Universal Jurisdiction over International Crimes and the Institut de Droit International, 4 
J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 561, 562 (2006); REYDAMS, supra note 13, at 16. 
 17 REYDAMS, supra note 13, at 43–68. 
 18 For example, the U.N. Principles of International Co-Operation in the Detection, Arrest, Extradition 
and Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity. Id. at 69.  
 19 See, e.g., MACEDO, supra note 11; IDI Resolution, supra note 11; REYDAMS, supra note 13, at 73–78. 
 20 See REDRESS & INT’L FED’N FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THE 
EUROPEAN UNION: A STUDY OF THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE 27 MEMBERS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 2–4 
(2010), http://www.redress.org/downloads/publications/Extraterritorial_Jurisdiction_In_the_27_Member_ 
States_of_the_European_Union.pdf [hereinafter EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION]; 
see also REYDAMS, supra note 13, at 81–226 (describing the universal jurisdiction in the municipal laws of 
fourteen states). 
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tribunals such as the ICC,21 the International Criminal Tribunal for the former 
Yugoslavia,22 and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.23 
This controversial doctrine has invoked both support and criticism. The 
proponents of the doctrine mainly mention its role in securing the interests of 
“society at large . . . in defending the integrity and credibility of its legal order 
and what it considers its essential interests and values,”24 thus preventing the 
impunity of “high-ranking dignitaries involved in actions showing a marked 
political dimension”25 and expressing a firm commitment to the protection of 
human rights.26 Its opponents, on the other hand, have claimed that universal 
jurisdiction prefers the victims’ interests over the rights of the accused, the 
most prominent of the latter being the right to avoid double jeopardy and to be 
protected from being persecuted by the authorities.27 In addition, they contend 
that universal jurisdiction has been exerted mainly and manipulatively against 
relatively minor suspects and could not, therefore, achieve its highest goal—
that is, to prevent impunity.28 Other critics have warned against the possibility 
that a full application of the doctrine may inhibit the cathartic processes of 
rehabilitation and reconciliation following mass atrocity.29 They also claim that 
universal jurisdiction may hinder the transition from authoritarianism to 
democracy and “the development and entrenchment of democratic institutions 
and attitudes” that “encourage a sense of self-government,”30 enabled, for 
example, by conducting trials of perpetrators of atrocities in the perpetrators’ 
own state. This controversy has generated the emergence of more subtle forms 
of universal jurisdiction, whose supporters acknowledge the fundamental role 
of states exercising universal jurisdiction in “a capacity . . . of a trustee of the 
 
 21 Final Act of the U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an 
International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 2004 [hereinafter Rome Statute].  
 22 Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 
48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993). 
 23 Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 99, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 
3453rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994). 
 24 Georges Abi-Saab, The Proper Role of Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 596, 597 (2003). 
 25 Antonio Casesse, Is the Bell Tolling for Universality?, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 589, 595 (2003). 
 26 Id. 
 27 George P. Fletcher, Against Universal Jurisdiction, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 580, 582 (2003). 
 28 Máximo Langer, The Diplomacy of Universal Jurisdiction: The Political Branches and the 
Transnational Prosecution of International Crimes, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 2–3 (2011). 
 29 Diane F. Orenlichter, The Future of Universal Jurisdiction, in UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL 
COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 214, 236–38 (Stephen 
Macedo ed., 2004). 
 30 Pablo De Greiff, Comment: Universal Jurisdiction and Transitions to Democracy, in UNIVERSAL 
JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
124–26 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004). 
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fundamental values of the international community,”31 and seek, for the 
reasons explained below, for ways to limit the concept’s absolute nature. 
B. Mitigated Universal Jurisdiction: Justifications 
In recent years, the doctrine of universal jurisdiction has been narrowed 
both in theory and in practice. Two important works have developed the 
theoretical grounds for a limited version of universal jurisdiction. The first was 
the 2001 Princeton Project.32 Supporting the proponents of universal 
jurisdiction and yet aware of the principle’s challengers and critics,33 a group 
of scholars and jurists in public international law, sponsored by Princeton 
University’s Program in Law and Public Affairs and other international law 
organizations,34 published a work on universal jurisdiction that aimed to 
develop consensus principles on this doctrine in 2001.35 Along with defining 
the scope and fundamentals of universal jurisdiction relating to issues such as 
immunity,36 amnesty,37 and the types of crimes the doctrine addresses,38 the 
scholars also accepted the conditioning of the doctrine on the resolution of 
competing national jurisdictions and the concept of subsidiarity to national 
legal systems.39 This can be described as a limited or mitigated version of 
universal jurisdiction. The second work was conducted by the Institute of 
International Law, whose 17th Commission accepted in 2005 a resolution on 
universal jurisdiction that conditioned this doctrine, inter alia, on the principle 
of subsidiarity.40 
In addition to the research of these committees, other scholars have 
promulgated an application of a limited version of the universality principle.41 
In summary, they developed two concepts: “universality plus” and 
 
 31 Kreβ, supra note 16, at 567. 
 32 See generally MACEDO, supra note 11.  
 33 “Universal jurisdiction holds out the promise of greater justice, but the jurisprudence of universal 
jurisdiction is disparate, disjointed and poorly understood. So long as that is so, this weapon against impunity 
is potentially beset by incoherence, confusion, and, at times, uneven justice.” See id. at 23. 
 34 These organizations include: the International Commission of Jurists, the American Association for the 
International Commission of Jurists, the Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights, and the Netherlands 
Institute of Human Rights. See id. at 19.  
 35 Id. at 6.  
 36 Id. at 31. 
 37 Id.  
 38 Id. at 28. 
 39 Id. at 32.  
 40 IDI Resolution, supra note 11, ¶¶ 3(c)–(d).  
 41 See Cassese, supra note 25; Abi-Saab, supra note 24; Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 
2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 59 (Feb. 14). 
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“conditional universality.” The former prefers the jurisdiction of the state that 
has the most significant links to the crime;42 the latter is a moderate conception 
of universality, according to which universal jurisdiction is applied only when 
the territorial or national state fails to act.43 The mitigated version of universal 
jurisdiction emerged through the practice of those states that legislated laws of 
universal jurisdiction, applying both the idea of conditional universality44 and 
that of universality plus.45 
The arguments supporting mitigated universal jurisdiction and criticizing 
what is referred to as “absolute universal jurisdiction”46 stem, nevertheless, 
from a point of departure that accepts the vitality of universal jurisdiction and 
does not aim to completely refute it. This perception rests, inter alia, on the 
fact that the goals of universal jurisdiction, especially preventing impunity 
from the perpetrators of international core crimes, are now universally 
endorsed not only by many scholars but also by significant courts and 
tribunals.47 Hence, the arguments presented hereinafter acknowledge “the vital 
role [that] national courts . . . play in combating impunity even when 
traditional jurisdictional connections are absent,”48 but they accept that these 
advantages apply only when legitimate domestic processes conducting genuine 
examinations of past atrocities are unavailable. 
The scholarly criticism of universal jurisdiction, in sum, considers 
questions of legitimacy, consistency, and externalized justice.49 The doubts 
over the legitimacy of universal jurisdiction, stemming from a presumption of 
bias when exerting universal jurisdiction, constitute a major consideration 
against its application. Most critics argue that universal jurisdiction is applied 
in courts of “developed countries pursuing dictators and war criminals from 
 
 42 Orenlichter, supra note 29, at 236. 
 43 Cassese, supra note 25, at 595. 
 44 See, e.g., infra Parts III.A.1, III.A.2, & III.A.4 (describing universal jurisdiction laws of Belgium, 
Germany, and France).  
 45 See, e.g., infra Part III.A.3 (discussing Spanish legislation).  
 46 Cassese, supra note 25, at 595. 
 47 The ICC is the most obvious representative of these courts. See Marcus v. Croatia, no. 4455/10, ¶ 126, 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 2014 (affirming the conviction of the appellant because “where a State agent has been charged 
with crimes involving torture or ill-treatment, it is of the utmost importance that criminal proceedings and 
sentencing are not time-barred and that the granting of an amnesty or pardon should not be permissible”).  
 48 Commentary to UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: NATIONAL COURTS AND THE PROSECUTION OF SERIOUS 
CRIMES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 27 (Stephen Macedo ed., 2004). 
 49 See generally Chandra Lekha Sriram, Revolutions in Accountability: New Approaches to Past Abuses, 
19 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 301, 357–74 (2003). 
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developing countries, but not the reverse.”50 “The states seeking to apply 
universal jurisdiction are largely countries of the ‘global north,’” which implies 
that these activities are illegitimate and even neo-colonialist.51 In a recent and 
comprehensive survey that aimed to cover all universal jurisdiction cases on 
international core crimes brought to justice since Eichmann,52 Máximo Langer 
argues that states avoid prosecuting major perpetrators of international core 
crimes.53 He contends that, given the substantial costs in terms of international 
relations paid by states applying universal jurisdiction, there are strong 
incentives for universal jurisdiction prosecuting states to concentrate on 
defendants who impose low international relations costs, as it is only in these 
cases that the political benefits of universal jurisdiction prosecutions and trials 
tend to outweigh the costs.54 
In addition to destabilizing the legitimacy of the doctrine of universal 
jurisdiction, the above argument also questions the doctrine’s consistency. 
Inconsistent standards, such as those applied by states deciding whether to 
apply universal jurisdiction in specific cases, give states a wide scope of 
action. They can “vex and harass their political opponents,”55 while at the same 
time preserving their political interests and assets.56 
While the arguments of (il)legitimacy or (in)consistency criticize universal 
jurisdiction in general, arguments of externalized justice more specifically 
suggest that universal jurisdiction is inferior to domestic mechanisms of justice 
in cases of societies in transition.57 Globalized justice is based on the rationale 
that it “provides an antidote to the impunity that accomplished despots are 
likely to enjoy in the countries that endured their crimes.”58 It thus may be the 
only solution when a state or a society is unwilling or unable to come to terms 
with the past because domestic justice is misled by the practice of amnesties or 
the state’s legal institutions are paralyzed and cannot act.59 However, 
externalized global justice seems to ignore the processes of transitional justice 
 
 50 Id. at 367. 
 51 Id. at 318. 
 52 See generally CrimA 40/61 Attorney-General of the Gov’t of Isr. v. Eichmann 36 I.L.R. 227 (1968) 
(Isr.). 
 53 Langer, supra note 28, at 5–6. 
 54 Id.  
 55 Sriram, supra note 49, at 370. 
 56 Langer, supra note 28, at 5. 
 57 See Orentlicher, supra note 29, at 232; Sriram, supra note 49, at 312, 375–76. 
 58 Orentlicher, supra note 29, at 232. 
 59 Sriram, supra note 49, at 376. 
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that have become prevalent since the 1970s in the form of truth commissions, 
local trials, hybrid courts, and other measures aimed at rehabilitation and 
reconciliation within societies that have suffered from atrocities.60 These 
processes advance the transition to constitutional democracy61 and incorporate 
the needs of those societies in transition as well as those of the victims of the 
crimes.62 
Transitional societies have numerous urgent needs that can include 
achieving stability, developing and entrenching democratic institutions and 
attitudes,63 and recovering from the implications of past mass atrocity, 
reconciliation, and rehabilitation.64 Local prosecutions seem to serve those 
goals much better than external ones.65 While internal prosecution may 
reinforce in-country democratic processes,66 external prosecutions, by contrast, 
can contribute to weak judicial and state capacity.67 In addition, “in-country 
justice . . . advance[s] a wounded nation’s recovery in the aftermath of mass 
atrocity”68 and promotes justice because it channels the desire for vengeance 
over prior wrongs into a legal trajectory.69 
Other advantages of local justice are related to assessing its ability to secure 
the needs of the victims of mass atrocities.70 Although both external and 
internal justice make victims’ stories public, officially endorse the truth, and 
provide compensation to victims,71 they both also exhibit some deficiencies. 
On the one hand, externalized justice better protects the interests of the victims 
in states where the new regime, established after the humanitarian crisis, is not 
democratic or fails in practice to secure human rights and the rule of law.72 On 
the other hand, externalized justice may have other flaws. While external trials 
provide acknowledgement of the crime,73 the sense of acknowledgment is 
much weaker and less pervasive when it is engendered by an outside 
 
 60 Id.  
 61 Orentlicher, supra note 29, at 232; De Greiff, supra note 30, at 124–25. 
 62 Sriram, supra note 49, at 375–76. 
 63 Id. at 379; De Greiff, supra note 30, at 124–25.  
 64 Orentlicher, supra note 29, at 236. 
 65 Id.  
 66 Id.  
 67 Sriram, supra note 49, at 382. 
 68 Orentlicher, supra note 29, at 236. 
 69 Sriram, supra note 49, at 382. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 385. 
 72 Id. at 381. 
 73 Id. at 386. 
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institution, such as a foreign national court.74 Also, the distance of proceedings 
may hinder the acknowledgement of the crimes because the victims may be 
unaware of the proceedings or unable to participate.75 
Lastly, internal justice systems may operate more effectively than external 
justice systems because numerous practical issues can be resolved in a much 
easier and more direct way in the territorial state or another state that has some 
nexus to the crime (such as the state of the crime’s victim).76 For example, the 
suspects are usually already present in the territory of the state of jurisdiction 
so there is no need to operate procedures for extradition; the evidence and 
interviewing witnesses are usually at hand;77 and finally, the lack of language 
and culture barriers also smoothens the technical proceedings.78 However, if 
the territorial state’s judicial system has collapsed and is not functioning 
because of destabilizing circumstances, the arguments for better efficacy of the 
internal justice systems will not prevail. The conclusion of the controversy 
between internal and external justice supporters is that neither form of justice 
is ultimately perfect. While globalized justice better secures the interests of the 
international community in bringing perpetrators to justice, exacting 
retribution, and denying amnesties, internal justice is better at reconciling the 
interests of the specific community that suffered from atrocities, reestablishing 
its own rule of law, ensuring justice for the victims, and executing efficient 
investigations and trial proceedings. From this, I conclude that universal 
jurisdiction should not be entirely neglected but rather limited by a principle 
that would render it a second best option. Complementarity or subsidiarity79 
can serve as such principles. 
The principle of complementarity makes universal jurisdiction a more 
practical and less objectionable concept. This principle was developed through 
the ICC’s founding statute and, as I will show, is applied both by the ICC and 
by states using universal jurisdiction. However, before delving into analysis of 
this principle, I will explain why states have continued to apply universal 
 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Brendan Leanos, Cooperative Justice: Understanding the Future of the International Criminal Court 
Through Its Involvement in Libya, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2267, 2284 (2012). Professor Laplante gives reasons 
for involving domestic courts in the proceedings of investigation and prosecutions. See id. at 2289.  
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
 79 See infra Part III for a brief discussion of the distinction and the similarities between complementarity 
and subsidiarity.  
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jurisdiction since the establishment of the ICC—in other words, I will examine 
cases in which the ICC cannot operate. 
II. LIMITATIONS OF ICC JURISDICTION 
The main purposes for establishing the ICC—whose legal foundation is the 
principle of universal jurisdiction—were to prevent the perpetration of 
international core crimes, to punish their perpetrators, and to prevent 
impunity.80 By constructing a special court for these purposes, the ICC also 
intended to indirectly prevent a competition over the forum conveniens for the 
prosecution of the perpetrators of international core crimes. It set a hierarchy of 
appropriate forums whereby the courts of the territorial state (or another state 
that has a connection to a specific case) are courts of first resort and the ICC is 
a court of second resort, intervening only in cases where the territorial state 
failed to investigate or prosecute.81 States that are parties to the Rome Statute 
are instructed to cooperate with the Court,82 to allow the office of the 
prosecutor (OTP) to launch investigations in their territory,83 to supply the 
OTP with records and documents,84 and to comply with the Court’s requests 
for arrest and surrender of suspects.85 
The ICC’s jurisdictional provisions authorize the Court to hear “certain 
cases, based upon the nature of the case, the parties involved, and how the case 
was initiated.”86 In addition, the Court is able to overcome impediments that 
would have barred states from applying jurisdiction on either a universal 
jurisdiction basis or other bases of criminal jurisdiction, such as territoriality, 
or active or passive personality. For example, a state that has jurisdiction over 
a case may be “barred from proceeding with an investigation or prosecution 
because the person concerned enjoys immunity under international law.”87 The 
Rome Statute, on the other hand, does not recognize customary law 
immunities.88 “Another conceivable example would be a resolution of the 
 
 80 Rome Statute, supra note 21, pmbl. 
 81 The concept of a court of second resort applies the concept of “mitigated universal jurisdiction.” See 
discussion supra Part I.B.  
 82 Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 86. 
 83 Id. art. 93. 
 84 Id. art. 93(1)(i). 
 85 Id. art. 89(1). 
 86 Leanos, supra note 76, at 2283. 
 87 See generally JANN K. KLEFFNER, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE ROME STATUTE AND NATIONAL 
CRIMINAL JURISDICTIONS (2009). 
 88 Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 27(2).  
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Security Council under Chapter VII, prohibiting a State or States from 
prosecuting a given (number of) individual(s).”89 
Nevertheless, the ICC is limited in other situations where states are not. 
The ICC’s jurisdiction is limited by four major conditions. First, its jurisdiction 
ratione materiae is limited to four types of international crimes: genocide, 
crimes against humanity, war crimes, and aggression.90 Second, its jurisdiction 
ratione loci is limited to offenses that were committed on the territory of a 
state that is party to the Rome Statute.91 Third, its jurisdiction ratione personae 
is limited to offenses committed by nationals of states who are parties to the 
Rome Statute.92 Fourth, its jurisdiction is narrowed by the complementarity 
principle, which requires the ICC to serve only as a court of last resort and 
only when a state that has nexus to the case is unwilling or unable to exert 
criminal proceedings and trials.93 
According to the Rome Statute, the U.N. Security Council can overcome 
the ICC’s jurisdictional limitations ratione personae and ratione loci.94 
However, the Council’s permanent members’ veto may obstruct such orders, 
as in the case of Syria described at the beginning of the Article. By contrast, 
states’ universal jurisdiction is limited only ratione materiae, in the same way 
that the ICC’s jurisdiction is limited by the principle of complementarity.95 
Hence, in cases where the offense has not been committed in the territory of a 
state party to the Rome Statute or by a national of such a state party, the ICC 
cannot investigate, let alone acquire jurisdiction, while the national courts of 
independent states are able to.96 
 
 89 KLEFFNER, supra note 87, at 158. 
 90 Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 5(1). 
 91 Id. art. 12. 
 92 Id. art. 12(2)(b). 
 93 Id. pmbl. See infra Part III for a discussion on the principle of complementarity. 
 94 The Rome Statute allows the U.N. Security Council to refer a case to the prosecutor of the Court even 
when the Court does not have jurisdiction ratione personae or ratione loci. Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 
13. 
 95 See infra Part III.A for a discussion on the application of universal jurisdictions by states. 
 96 Note that the ICC’s jurisdiction is also limited ratione loci to cases that occurred in the territory of a 
state party to the Rome Statute or in a territory of a state that accepts the court’s jurisdiction ad hoc the 
jurisdiction of the court. See Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 12(3). This means that when a situation arises in 
a territory that belongs to an entity not defined as a state according to international law principles, the ICC 
does not have jurisdiction over the situation. This was the case when the Palestinian Authority addressed the 
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and asked that the Court investigate the situation in the Gaza strip after the 
Israeli Defense Forces launched operation Cast Lead (December 27, 2008-January 18, 2009). The ICC 
prosecutor determined that the Court was barred from intervening, and the Palestinian Authority could not ask 
it to apply jurisdiction because the Palestinian Authority was not defined as a state according to international 
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In addition, the ICC may be barred from acting when its extradition 
requests are not answered. While states that are parties to the Rome Statute are 
obliged to cooperate with the Court and to extradite suspects according to its 
requests, states that are not parties to the Rome Statute are under no such 
obligation. Because of this, the fact that the ICC does not conduct trials in 
absentia97 if the suspect was not extradited to the Court means that it may not 
be able to operate even when it acquires jurisdiction over a case. By contrast, 
some states not parties to the Rome Statute are nevertheless parties to 
international conventions that proscribe and criminalize war crimes,98 
genocide,99 or crimes against humanity,100 so they are under an obligation to 
prosecute or extradite the perpetrators of such crimes.101 Moreover, while there 
 
law. See Palestinian Nat’l Auth., Declaration Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court 
(Jan. 21, 2009), for the declaration of the Palestinian National Authority recognizing the jurisdiction of the 
ICC. See Situation in Palestine, INT’L CRIM. CT. (Apr. 3, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/9B65 
1B80-EC43-4945-BF5A-FAFF5F334B92/284387/SituationinPalestine030412ENG.pdf, for the OTP’s 
decision. However, recently, “UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon confirmed that the Palestinians will 
formally become a member of the ICC on April 1, 2015 and the Court's registrar said that jurisdiction would 
date back to June 13, 2014.” Michelle Nichols, Louis Charbonneau & Thomas Escritt, U.N. Confirms 
Palestinians Will be ICC Member on April 1, REUTERS (Jan. 7, 2015, 6:16 PM), http://www.reuters.com/ 
article/2015/01/07/us-palestinians-israel-un-idUSKBN0KG1JV20150107. In addition, on January 16, 2015 the 
OTP decided to open a preliminary examination of the situation in Palestine. See Press Release, Office of the 
Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Court, The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, Opens a 
Preliminary Examination of the Situation in Palestine (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/ 
press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/pr1083.aspx. 
 97 Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 63. The Trial Chamber may remove the accused only when the 
accused continues to disrupt the trial, but it “shall make provision for him or her to observe the trial and 
instruct counsel from outside the courtroom.” Id. art. 63(2). 
 98 For example, Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva Convention I]; 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed 
Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva 
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 
[hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilians Persons in Time of 
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. All states are 
parties to these conventions. The four conventions will be hereinafter referred to as the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. 
 99 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 
277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention]. 
 100 See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture]. 
 101 See Geneva Convention I, supra note 98, art. 49; Geneva Convention II, supra note 98, art. 50; Geneva 
Convention III, supra note 98, art. 129; Geneva Convention IV, supra note 98, art. 146; Genocide Convention, 
supra note 99, arts. 5, 7; Convention Against Torture, supra note 100, arts. 4, 5, 8. 
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is controversy over the legality of universal jurisdiction in absentia,102 it is 
more generally accepted that a prohibition on trials in absentia should not 
include a prohibition on the commencement of investigation in the absence of 
the suspect, as is indeed allowed by many continental legal systems.103 In 
addition, there seems to be no customary rule prohibiting trials in absentia 
based solely on universal jurisdiction,104 and as some continental law states do 
not proscribe such trials,105 more trajectories are open for states to apply 
universal jurisdiction when the ICC is blocked from interfering. 
Under the above-discussed circumstances, when the ICC cannot apply its 
jurisdiction, national courts must interfere by applying universal jurisdiction. 
However, as suggested above, national courts, like the ICC, tend to limit their 
jurisdiction through the principle of complementarity or subsidiarity. In the 
following section I discuss this principle. I refer briefly to its origins and 
analyze its basic parameters, which are reflected in the principle's demand that 
external justice will be operated if the domestic (default) state is “unwilling or 
unable” to exert its jurisdiction.106 Finally, I show that in recent years some 
states have adopted the principle of complementarity in their own universal 
jurisdiction legislation, referring to it as the “subsidiarity principle.” I review 
the legislation of states that include this principle and analyze the main cases 
where it has been applied by national courts. 
III. THE PRINCIPLE OF COMPLEMENTARITY 
I will begin the discussion with a note on whether or not a distinction be-
tween complementarity and subsidiarity is required. The principle of subsidiar-
ity dictates that “a central authority should have a subsidiary function, per-
forming only those tasks which cannot be performed effectively at a more 
immediate or local level.”107 Complementarity, on the other hand, describes “a 
relationship in which two or more different things improve or emphasize each 
other's qualities.”108 Subsidiarity implies that universal jurisdiction is subsidi-
 
 102 Kreβ, supra note 16, at 576; Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo 
v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 9 (Feb. 14) (separate opinion by Guillaume, J.). Cf. Case Concerning 
the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 7 (Feb. 14) 
(separate opinion by Higgins, Koojmans & Burghenthal, J). 
 103 Kreβ, supra note 16, at 576–77. 
 104 Id. at 578–79 
 105 O’Keefe, supra note 14, at 750. 
 106 Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 17(1)(a). 
 107 Subsidiarity, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2015). 
 108 Complementarity, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY (2015). 
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ary to local jurisdictions, that is, universal jurisdiction as a jurisdiction of last 
resort; on the other hand, complementarity seems to posit that both the univer-
sal and the local jurisdiction are on par, so that both jurisdictions complete 
each other’s deficiencies and function together as a unit,109 and neither is sub-
sidiary to the other.  
However, complementarity and subsidiarity are not entirely different, and 
the resemblance between them is evident.110 Moreover, in the context of inter-
national criminal law and according to the interpretation of the principle of 
complementarity by the Rome Statute of the ICC, which posits the Court as a 
court of last resort, it seems that complementarity should be understood as a 
synonym to subsidiarity, or as “a manifestation of subsidiarity in the [interna-
tional criminal law] system.”111 Therefore, despite the fact that the Rome Stat-
ute uses “complementarity” while domestic criminal jurisdictions that apply 
universal jurisdiction often use “subsidiarity” to refer to the principle that miti-
gates the application of universal jurisdiction or subjects it to several precondi-
tions, the terms can be used interchangeably. I prefer the term “complementari-
ty” because, as explained below, the concept of mitigated universal jurisdiction 
was developed by the ICC's legacy, and the states that adopted the mitigated 
concept relied on this legacy, notwithstanding their use of the term “subsidiari-
ty” to refer to the mitigating principle.  
Complementarity is one of the core principles of the ICC. It is established 
as a legal principle112 both by the Preamble to the Rome Statute and by the 
statute's first article, which declares that the ICC shall be “complementary to 
national criminal jurisdictions.”113 With the idea that the ICC and domestic ju-
risdictions complete and perfect each other and supply each other’s deficien-
cies,114 the Rome Statute promulgates a system in which the prosecution of se-
rious international crimes should involve measures at the national level and at 
the international level.115 Moreover, the ICC determined that “the principle of 
complementarity expresses a preference for national investigations and prose-
 
 109 See KLEFFNER, supra note 87, at 100. 
 110 GILAD NOAM, ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER BETWEEN DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL COURTS 
AND TRIBUNALS 379 (2012); see Hervé Ascensio, Are Spanish Courts Backing Down on Universality? The 
Supreme Tribunal’s Decision in Guatemalan Generals, 1 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 690, 696 (2003). 
 111 NOAM, supra note 110, at 380. 
 112 KLEFFNER, supra note 87, at 100. 
 113 Rome Statute, supra note 21, pmbl., art. 1.  
 114 KLEFFNER, supra note 87, at 100. 
 115 Id. at 100–01. 
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cutions.”116 Therefore, national criminal jurisdictions are the default and first 
resort for prosecution, while the Court is rather filling in their deficiencies. As 
Louis Moreno Ocampo, the first Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, articulated his 
view of the ICC when he was appointed:  
The Court is complementary to national systems. This means that 
whenever there is genuine state action, the Court cannot and will not 
intervene. As a consequence of complementarity, the number of cases 
that reach the Court should not be a measure of its efficiency. On the 
contrary, the absence of trials before this Court, as a consequence of 
the regular functioning of national institutions, would be a major suc-
cess.117  
The main goal of the ICC—ending impunity for perpetrators of serious in-
ternational crimes—seems to conflict with complementarity,118 as comple-
mentarity places the Court in a position secondary to national jurisdictions 
for achieving this goal. However, Ocampo's words combined with the ICC's 
reliance on the principle of complementarity suggest that the basic tenet at the 
foundation of the ICC was in fact the concept of mitigated universal jurisdic-
tion, rather than its absolute type; this former concept was believed to best 
achieve the ICC's primary goal to end impunity for the world's most serious 
crimes.119  
The justifications for the principle of complementarity coalesce with those 
supporting mitigated universal jurisdiction. Therefore, just like mitigated uni-
versal jurisdiction, complementarity is considered to achieve the goals of the 
court by simultaneously safeguarding state sovereignty;120 empowering domes-
tic jurisdictions throughout the world and encouraging them to build up their 
domestic judicial systems;121 enhancing and promoting the emergence of a 
norm of genuine national criminal proceedings;122 and ensuring that the ICC 
interferes effectively when national criminal proceedings are committed in bad 
faith or cannot be exerted.123  
 
 116 Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision on the Admissibility of the Case Against 
Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, ¶215 (May 31, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1599307.pdf.  
 117 Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Chief Prosecutor, ICC, Statement Made at the Ceremony for the Solemn Un-
dertaking of the Chief Prosecutor at the ICC, at 2 (June 16, 2003).  
 118 JO STIGEN, THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND NATIONAL 
JURISDICTIONS 15 (2008). 
 119 Leanos, supra note 76, at 2281.  
 120 STIGEN, supra note 118, at 15. 
 121 Leanos, supra note 76, at 2281. 
 122 STIGEN, supra note 118, at 18. 
 123 Id. at 19. 
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The secondary place of the ICC in relation to the primary role of national 
jurisdictions124 is expressed in the admissibility rule established by Article 17 
of the Rome Statute, which formulates a regime for the allocation of the judi-
cial competences of the ICC and national criminal jurisdictions.125 According 
to this regime, national jurisdictions have priority in the investigation and 
prosecution of international core crimes, and cases are admissible before the 
ICC only if the default prosecuting state is “unable or unwilling”126 to carry out 
criminal (i.e., investigative or prosecutorial) proceedings.  
The inability or unwillingness of the state that has jurisdiction must be clar-
ified in order to determine the “winners of the competition” between the ICC 
and domestic jurisdictions. However, three prior preconditions should prevail 
to determine the presence of such a competition.127 Both jurisdictions should 
address (1) the same case;128 (2) the same person;129 and (3) the same con-
duct.130 Even though these preconditions are relevant to determine the admissi-
bility of cases before the ICC, I will not include them in my analysis of the 
complementarity principle because it presupposes a competition between the 
ICC and domestic jurisdictions and focuses on how to determine the winners 
of this competition. Therefore, my point of departure is that these precondi-
tions have already been fulfilled,131 and my analysis henceforth focuses on the 
terms “unwillingness and inability.”132  
 
 124 KLEFFNER, supra note 87, at 57, 99. 
 125 Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 17(1)(a).  
 126 Id.  
 127 The ICC also relates to these parameters as prior conditions for the evaluation of unwillingness and 
inability. The Court stated: “[I]n considering whether a case is inadmissible under Article 17(1)(a) and (b) of 
the Statute, the initial questions to ask are (1) whether there are ongoing investigations or prosecutions, or (2) 
whether there have been investigations in the past, and the State having jurisdiction has decided not to prose-
cute the person concerned. It is only when the answers to these questions are in the affirmative that one has to 
look to the second halves of sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) and to examine the question of unwillingness and ina-
bility. To do otherwise would be to put the cart before the horse.” See Prosecutor v. Gadaffi, Case No. ICC-
01/11-01/11 OA 4, Judgment, ¶ 213 (May 21, 2014), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1779877.pdf.  
 128 Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 17(1)(a)–(b).  
 129 Id. art. 17(1)(b).  
 130 Id. art. 17(1)(c).  
 131 For the discussion of these parameters, see generally KLEFFNER, supra note 87, at 114–25; STIGEN, 
supra note 118, at 91–93, 197–99; NOAM, supra note 110, at 220–25. For an analysis of the ICC’s interpreta-
tion of these parameters, especially how the ICC determines whether the same case is investigated by compet-
ing domestic jurisdictions, see NOAM, supra note 110, at 259–98. 
 132 However, the “same case” precondition may be included among the “unwillingness or inability” pa-
rameters, because the state might prosecute a different case (for example, not characterize a killing as geno-
cide) due to its unwillingness or inability to conduct genuine proceedings. See STIGEN, supra note 118, at 198. 
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Article 17(2) of the Rome Statute determines that the unwillingness of a 
state to conduct criminal proceedings shall consider the parameters listed be-
low, and that in assessing these parameters the Court should have “regard to 
the principles of due process recognized by international law.”133 The unwill-
ingness of the prosecuting state is defined as follows: 
(a) The proceedings were or are being undertaken or the national de-
cision was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned 
from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the 
Court; 
(b) There has been an unjustified delay in the proceedings which 
in the circumstances is inconsistent with an intent to bring the per-
son concerned to justice;  
(c) The proceedings were not or are not being conducted inde-
pendently or impartially, and they were or are being conducted in 
a manner which, in the circumstances, is inconsistent with an in-
tent to bring the person concerned to justice.134  
The inability of the state is defined as “whether, due to a total or substantial 
collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the state is unable to 
obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise una-
ble to carry out its proceedings.”135 
Before delving into the interpretation of the standards of unwillingness and 
inability, two general remarks should be made. First, the inability and unwill-
ingness are attributed to a state. Because the state is an abstract entity, its 
“will” to act is referred to the will of its organs.136 Therefore, if one of the 
state's branches of power (i.e., the executive, the legislature, or the judiciary) 
expresses an unwillingness or inability to conduct a criminal investigation, the 
state will be considered as unwilling or unable.137 Relatedly, the ability and 
willingness (as opposed to inability and unwillingness) of the state are rather 
determined upon the attitude of the state's composite organs.138 Therefore, the 
 
 133 Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 17(2).  
 134 Id. art. 17(2)(a)–(c). 
 135 Id. art. 17(3). 
 136 STIGEN, supra note 118, at 254. 
 137 Int’l Law Comm’n, Text of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, art. 4(1), in Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001); STIGEN, supra note 
118, at 255.  
 138 KLEFFNER, supra note 87, at 107. 
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willingness of one organ to initiate criminal proceedings will not compensate 
for the lack of such will on behalf of the other organs.139 
Another preliminary question is which states are in fact in “competition” 
with the ICC with regard to acquiring jurisdiction over a case. Article 17(1) 
establishes that the relevant states are those that “[have] jurisdiction.” Deter-
mining which state has jurisdiction over a specific case is crucial for the dis-
cussion in Article 17(1) because it accounts for questions regarding the compe-
tition between different states over jurisdiction. If the states applying mitigated 
universal jurisdiction accept the precondition that their jurisdiction may be 
given up for “the state that has jurisdiction,” then the question of what it means 
to “have jurisdiction” should be answered. 
In the criminal context, jurisdiction refers to that exerted by the different 
organs involved in different phases of criminal proceedings, such as the inves-
tigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative authorities.140 In addition, jurisdiction 
has different meanings in international and national law. Jann Kleffner sug-
gests that both meanings should be considered, such that the definition of “‘a 
State which has jurisdiction over a case’ refers to States which have estab-
lished domestic jurisdiction in conformity with international law.”141 He adds 
that under “the assumption on which complementarity is based, namely that 
states have the possibility to exercise jurisdiction and have taken at least initial 
investigative steps . . . [it is] decisive for the ambit of permissible action of na-
tional investigative or prosecutorial authorities that jurisdiction be available 
under national law.”142 However, because “the ICC defers cases to States 
which have the legal right, under international law, to exercise jurisdiction . . . 
the term ‘jurisdiction’ thus needs to [also] be understood to refer to jurisdiction 
in its international connotation.”143 
Having defined the states that participate in the competition with the ICC 
for jurisdiction over a case, I turn to analyze the conditions under which this 
competition should be resolved: the willingness and ability of those states to 
begin criminal proceedings. In the Rome Statute, the standards of unwilling-
ness and inability were not clearly established.144 Indeed, whether these terms 
 
 139 Id.  
 140 Id. at 111. 
 141 Id. at 113. 
 142 Id. at 112. 
 143 Id. at 113. 
 144 Mark S. Ellis, The International Criminal Court and Its Implication for Domestic Law and National 
Capacity Building, 15 FLA. J. INT’L L. 215, 236 (2002). 
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should be interpreted broadly, so as to leave more room for the court to inter-
fere, or restrictively145 is a matter of policy.  
The delegates drafting the Statute believed that the ICC had too broad a 
discretion in defining these terms, as all that the Statute provides as a guideline 
of interpretation is that the ICC shall have “regard to the principles of due pro-
cess recognized by international law.”146 In addition, the OTP addressed the 
difficulties in interpreting the “unwillingness” of the state that has jurisdiction, 
and assessed that “it will often require the Court to infer its conclusions from 
highly circumstantial evidence, and those conclusions will often implicate ‘po-
litically sensitive’ issues.”147  
Nevertheless, scholars have suggested some very detailed and complex 
interpretative criteria for both “unwillingness” and “inability.” In some cases, 
scholars have relied on the interpretation of relevant international norms and 
standards accounted for by various international law instruments—such as 
international treaties,148 the decisions of human rights courts and 
committees,149 the reports of international committees,150 and U.N. 
instruments151—likely to prove that their suggested criteria do not stem merely 
from a subjective analysis. 
Stigen interprets “unwillingness” according to three factors mentioned in 
Article 17(2): “shielding the person concerned,”152 “unjustified delay” in the 
trial or investigative proceedings,153 and lack of independence or 
impartiality.154 He then breaks down each of the factors into elements that 
serve as criteria for interpreting them.155 For example, he suggests that 
“shielding the person concerned” consists of five elements, the most intricate 
of which is “the purpose of shielding.”156 This element alone requires assessing 
 
 145 STIGEN, supra note 118, at 252. 
 146 Ellis, supra note 144, at 236 (citing Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 17(2)).  
 147 Leanos, supra note 76, at 2285. 
 148 KLEFFNER, supra note 87, at 129 (discussing the concept of fair trials). 
 149 See, e.g., id. at 139 (analyzing “unjustified delay”); STIGEN, supra note 118, at 266–67 (analyzing 
limited access to the justice system).  
 150 STIGEN, supra note 118, at 269 (analyzing “[i]ntimidation of actors in the proceedings”).  
 151 Id. at 269–70 (analyzing “[i]ntimidation of actors in the proceedings”).  
 152 Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 17(2)(a). 
 153 Id. art. 17(2)(b). 
 154 Id. art. 17(2)(c).  
 155 STIGEN, supra note 118, at 256–309. 
 156 See id. at 261–62. 
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twenty-three indications of such a purpose.157 A few examples of those 
indications are: the existence of “[n]one or few successful investigations and 
prosecutions” on behalf of the state that has jurisdiction,158 recognizing a 
“[s]hared purpose between the state and the suspect,”159 and “inadequate 
legislation” on behalf of the state that has jurisdiction so that it is not able to 
deal with international crimes.160 
Kleffner also discusses the three factors of unwillingness and bases his 
conclusions on, inter alia, a linguistic analysis of the relevant terms in the 
official languages of the Rome Statute,161 the reports of the ICC’s preparatory 
committee,162 decisions of international tribunals,163 and international 
treaties.164 For example, to assess the indicators of the purpose of shielding, 
Kleffner relates to the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s 
(ICTY) decision regarding command responsibility for war crimes.165 Kleffner 
also suggests that a superior who does not submit a matter of suspicion that his 
subordinate committed war crimes to the investigation of competent authorities 
will be considered as acting under a purpose of shielding the subordinate.166 
Regarding the factor of unjustified delays, Kleffner analyzes the European 
Convention on Human Rights’ protections of the right to be tried without due 
delay and to a hearing within a reasonable time in the determination of 
criminal charges.167 
The standard of inability is more straightforward and objective,168 and yet it 
still requires some inquiry. As mentioned above, inability refers to a “total or 
substantial collapse or unavailability” of the state’s national judicial system 
that prevents the state from executing criminal proceedings and undermines the 
state’s ability to secure the accused or to obtain necessary evidence and 
testimony.169 Inability is portrayed as a restrictive standard of interference 
 
 157 See id. at 262–88. 
 158 See id. at 263. 
 159 Id. at 264 
 160 Id. at 265. 
 161 See, e.g., KLEFFNER, supra note 87, at 135 (discussing the purpose of shielding according to the 
French version of the article). 
 162 Id. at 135 n.172 (discussing the terms “proceeding” and “national decision”).  
 163 Id. at 137. 
 164 Id. at 139. 
 165 Id. at 137 n.185. 
 166 Id. at 137. 
 167 Id. at 139. 
 168 KLEFFNER, supra note 87, at 152–53; Leanos, supra note 76, at 2286. 
 169 Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 17(3). 
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since the admissibility of cases before the court is limited, according to this 
standard, to cases of either a total or a substantial collapse or unavailability of 
the state’s judicial system.170 A partial collapse or unavailability, for example, 
would not suffice.171 Nevertheless, distinguishing between a partial and a 
substantial collapse or deciding when the threshold of substantial collapse is 
met is not clearly defined in the statute.172 Kleffner suggests that the distinction 
“can be derived from the ordinary meaning of the two terms and is confirmed 
by the drafting history of Article 17(3). When shifting resources can 
compensate such a partial collapse or transfer the trial to other venues, the 
threshold of substantial collapse is not met.”173 
Stigen adds that the level of the collapse can be assessed according to its 
impact and duration, which must be “great and long enough to justify the use 
of the term ‘substantial.’”174 
Another relevant distinction is made between collapse and unavailability. 
Unavailability seems to cover situations where a legal system has not collapsed 
but is “inadequate (not accessible or not useful) for the purpose of dealing 
genuinely with a given case.”175 Such is the case, for example, when the 
judicial system has not collapsed but is too weak to carry out proceedings.176 
Stigen proposes four factors that may lead to a judicial system’s unavailability: 
(1) “inadequate legal provisions” (such as lack of substantive or procedural 
penal legislation and lack of access to the system);177 (2) “legal obstacles to the 
use of the system” (such as amnesties or lack of evidence and testimony);178 
(3) “factual obstacles to the use of the system” (such as lack of necessary 
personnel, judges, investigators, prosecutor; or lack of judicial 
infrastructure);179 and (4) “the system’s incapability of producing the desired 
result.”180 These factors are relevant both for “deficiencies in the 
implementation of the specific legal framework for the investigation and 
 
 170 KLEFFNER, supra note 87, at 153. 
 171 Id. (noting that the notion of “partial collapse” in earlier drafts of the Rome Statute was replaced by the 
notion of “substantial collapse”). 
 172 Id. at 155. 
 173 Id.  
 174 STIGEN, supra note 118, at 316. 
 175 Id. at 317. 
 176 KLEFFNER, supra note 87, at 155. 
 177 STIGEN, supra note 118, at 318.  
 178 Id. 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. 
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prosecution of core crimes . . . [and] the lack of implementation in domestic 
legal orders . . . of international standards on procedural requirements.”181 
The parameters of the standard of inability were practically applied recently 
by the ICC in the case against Saif Al-Islam, the son of the former President of 
Libya, Muammar Gaddafi, in which the ICC issued an arrest warrant for the 
charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity.182 The Pre-Trial Chamber 
stipulated that while the Libyan judicial system did not collapse, as “the 
authorities for the administration of justice may exist and function in Libya,”183 
the system was nevertheless unavailable for the purposes of the case.184 The 
court added that there were legal obstacles to the use of the system, as the 
national judicial system was unable to obtain the accused and secure Al-
Islam’s transfer from his place of detention under the custody of the Zintan 
militia into state authority.185 It was also unable to obtain testimony because of 
the inability of judicial governmental authorities to ascertain control and 
provide adequate witness protection.186 In addition, it was unable to carry out 
the proceedings and produce the desired result because it could not secure legal 
representation for the accused in view of the security situation in Libya and the 
risk faced by lawyers who act for associates of the former regime.187 This 
impediment prevented the progress of proceedings against the accused as it 
stood in contrast with the rights and protections of the Libyan national justice 
system and Libya’s Constitutional Declaration,188 and rendered the national 
judicial system unavailable and the case before the ICC admissible according 
to the complementarity criteria set forth in Article 17(1)(3) of the Rome 
Statute. 
In summary of the analysis of the standards of willingness and ability, I 
note that it is not always necessary to examine the presence of both 
unwillingness and inability of a state with jurisdiction to decide the 
admissibility of a case before the ICC; the presence of one standard is 
 
 181 KLEFFNER, supra note 87, at 157. 
 182 Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-14, Warrant of Arrest, at 3 (June 27, 2011), http://www. 
icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1099329.pdf.   
 183 Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, Case No. ICC-01/11-01/11, Decision on the Admissibility of the Case Against 
Saif Al-Islam Gaddafi, ¶ 215 (May 31, 2013), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1599307.pdf.  
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. ¶ 206. 
 186 Id. ¶ 209. 
 187 Id. ¶ 212. 
 188 Id. ¶ 214. 
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sufficient.189 Nevertheless, the independence of the judicial system is one 
criterion that is common in assessing both willingness and ability of the 
state.190 The judicial system of a state must, at a minimum, be judged as 
independent if it is to be viewed as not experiencing a substantial or total 
collapse of its institutions and therefore able to undertake prosecutions.191 
However, the minimum standards for judicial independence would include a 
judicial system that is impartial,192 which is also one of the factors of 
(un)willingness. In Part IV, when discussing the implications of this Article’s 
analysis for the Syrian case, I address further the criterion of independence and 
its central place in determining which state should have jurisdiction. 
Before turning to discuss the parameters of complementarity that emerge 
from national legislation and the decisions of national courts (in most of these 
statutes referred to as subsidiarity), I should note that there is no guidance in 
the ICC jurisprudence regarding the standards of proof of the parameters of 
unwillingness and inability in determining the admissibility of a case before 
the ICC. As the Pre-Trial Chamber in Saif Al-Islam case mentioned: 
Different standards of proof are explicitly set out in the Statute for 
distinct stages of the proceedings from the issuance of a warrant of 
arrest, to the confirmation of charges and the final trial judgment. 
Those standards of proof, however, do not apply to the admissibility 
determination which deals inter alia with the question as to whether 
domestic authorities are taking concrete and progressive steps to 
investigate or prosecute the same case before the Court.193  
 Rather, “[t]he Chamber is guided by the jurisprudence of the Appeals 
Chamber to the effect that the State ‘must provide the court with evidence 
of a sufficient degree of specificity and probative value that demonstrates 
that it is indeed investigating the case.’”194 
 
 189 See id. ¶ 216 (describing the Court’s determination in the Ghaddafi case that because “Libya has been 
found to be unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution against [Ghaddafi] . . . the Chamber 
need not address the alternative requirement of ‘willingness’”). 
 190 Ellis, supra note 144, at 237. 
 191 Id. at 238. 
 192 Id. at 237–38. 
 193 Prosecutor v. Gaddafi, supra note 183, ¶ 54. 
 194 Id. ¶ 54 (quoting Prosecutor v. Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Judgment on the 
Appeal of the Republic of Kenya Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 2011 Entitled 
“Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant 
to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute,” ¶ 48 (Aug. 30, 2011)). 
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A. Subsidiarity in the Practice of Domestic Legislation and Domestic Courts 
In the last few decades, the number of states legislating laws of universal 
jurisdiction has been rising.195 In addition to Australia,196 Canada,197 the United 
States,198 and New Zealand,199 numerous European states have also legislated 
such laws.200 According to the REDRESS and International Federation for 
Human Rights (FIDH) report,201 which reviewed the legislation of member 
states of the European Union, twenty-nine states have extraterritorial 
jurisdiction.202 Twenty-five states limit their jurisdiction with a subsidiarity 
clause.203 While these clauses differ in their formulations, they include general 
common preconditions, such as the following: applying jurisdiction only when 
the territorial state, another competent state, or an international court does 
not;204 demanding extradition to be the first resort205 or conditioning 
jurisdiction on receiving no extradition requests from other states;206 
conditioning jurisdiction on the rule of double jeopardy;207 and dismissing 
investigation or prosecution where an authority of another country or an 
international tribunal is investigating the alleged crime.208 In addition, some of 
the states that appear in this survey use a very similar wording in their 
subsidiarity clauses to that of the ICC complementarity clause, and they 
subject their jurisdiction to another state’s (usually the territorial or another 
state that has a nexus to the case) only if the latter has a “properly functioning 
 
 195 See generally REYDAMS, supra note 13, at 83 (presenting research on states that apply universal 
jurisdiction). 
 196 Id. at 86–92. 
 197 Id. at 119–25. 
 198 Id. at 220–26.  
 199 Juliet Hay, Implementing the ICC Statue in New Zealand, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 191, 196 (2004). 
 200 EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 20, at 1–4. 
 201 See generally id.  
 202 The states are Austria, Slovakia, Germany, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Greece, Malta, Hungary, Lithuania, Ireland, Latvia, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Id. at iv–v. 
 203 Austria, Germany, Belgium, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Greece, Malta, Hungary, 
Latvia, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and 
Northern Ireland. See id. at 39.  
 204 For example, in Austria, Bulgaria, and Hungary, the courts are subsidiary to international tribunals and 
the ICC; in Ireland the courts are subsidiary to the ICC; in Latvia and Spain, the courts are subsidiary both to 
international courts and tribunals and to other national courts that have nexus to the case. See id. 
 205 See id. at 102, 131, 215, 219, 232 (Czech Republic, France, Portugal, Romania, and Slovenia, 
respectively).  
 206 Id. at 166 (Italy).  
 207 Id. at 148 (Greece). 
 208 Id. at 253 (Switzerland). 
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legal system”209 that has been verified as willing,210 independent, impartial, 
and equitable.211 
Except for Canada, which incorporated the ICC complementarity clause 
into its universal jurisdiction law almost verbatim,212 states address the 
considerations of the ICC clause mainly indirectly or comparatively within the 
legislation and dicta that subject their universal jurisdiction laws to the 
subsidiarity principle.213 Unfortunately, there is no clear consistent state 
practice regarding the application of the parameters of the principle of 
subsidiarity or the standard of proof required for its emergence.214 
Nevertheless, I will hereby address the universal jurisdiction legislation in four 
European states that address the subsidiarity principle either directly through 
the law or through courts’ decisions that discuss the application of universal 
jurisdiction. 
1. Belgium 
Belgium was the pioneer state in Europe for applying universal jurisdiction 
to prosecutions of crimes under international law.215 As it was enacted in 1878, 
Belgium’s universal jurisdiction law allowed for a wide-ranging scope of 
jurisdiction.216 However, in 2003 the law was amended to limit this range.217 
The Belgian law provides for universal jurisdiction in three cases. The first is 
when grave violations of international humanitarian law are committed by a 
person who at the time of the offense is a Belgian national or “who has been 
effectively habitually and legally residing in Belgium for at least three 
 
 209 Id. at 203, 246 (Norway, Sweden). 
 210 Id. at 246 (Sweden). 
 211 Id. at 80 (Belgium). The preconditions mentioned in notes 208–10 will henceforth be referred to as the 
“willingness and ability” conditions. 
 212 Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, S.C. 2000, c 24 (Can.) (Section 12 determines that the 
double jeopardy protection (i.e., the pleas of autrefois acquit, autrefois convict and pardon) applies unless the 
proceedings in the foreign court were for the purpose of shielding the person from criminal responsibility or 
were not otherwise conducted independently or impartially in accordance with the norms of due process 
recognized by international law, and were conducted in a manner that, in the circumstances, was inconsistent 
with an intent to bring the person to justice.). 
 213 See, e.g., S.A.N., July 9, 2009 (R.G.D., No. 1/09) (Spain).  
 214 Kreβ, supra note 16, at 580.  
 215 EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 20, at 77. 
 216 Loi concernnat le titre preliminaire du code de procedure [Law Containing the First Title of the 
Criminal Procedure Code (TCCP)] of Apr. 17, 1878, BELGISCH STAATSBLAD [B.S.] [Official Gazette of 
Belgium], Apr. 17, 1878, http://www.staatsblad.be.  
 217 EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 20, at 78.  
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years;”218 the second is when the victim of the crime is a Belgian citizen;219 the 
third case is any offense under international customary or treaty law when 
there is a legal requirement that the case be submitted to Belgian authorities.220 
All of these cases are conditioned upon a subsidiarity paragraph that 
determines that Belgium has jurisdiction in these cases unless 
it appears . . . that . . . the case should be brought before either the 
international courts, the courts of the place where the offence was 
committed or the courts of the country of which the perpetrator is a 
national . . . on condition that these courts offer the standards of 
independence, impartiality and fairness required under the 
international commitments linking Belgium to the state concerned.221 
Investigations are conducted either as a result of the federal prosecutor’s 
initiative or because a complaint has been lodged.222 In order to decide whether 
to proceed with a complaint and to petition an examining magistrate to conduct 
the preliminary inquiry, the federal prosecutor, under the control of the 
indictment chamber, must verify the guarantees of impartiality, independence 
and fairness provided by the competing national legal system or systems that 
have jurisdiction over the case other than Belgium.223 
According to the FIDH and REDRESS report, in practice the subsidiarity 
concept will be invoked only where the court receives an effective submission 
of a case of an international or foreign jurisdiction while the theoretical 
competence of another court is not sufficient.224 So far, the application of the 
subsidiarity principle by the federal prosecutor has not been required, and 
therefore the courts have not been asked to consider this principle. 
2. Germany 
Like in Belgium, the German universal jurisdiction laws also address the 
principle of subsidiarity. The universality principle is grounded in the German 
 
 218 Id. at 86. 
 219 Id. at 78 (provided that the foreigner is in Belgium and the act is punishable under the law of the place 
of commission by at least five years imprisonment). 
 220 Id. 
 221 Id. at 86 (emphasis added). 
 222 Id. at 80.  
 223 Id. In addition, the prosecutor will not proceed with a complaint if it is manifestly unfounded, where 
the facts in the complaint do not correspond to a relevant offense of serious violations of international 
humanitarian law or of any other international offense incriminated by a treaty involving Belgium, and where 
an admissible public action cannot derive from the complaint.  
 224 EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 20, at 80. 
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Penal Code225 and in the Code of Crimes Against International Law 
(CCAIL).226 The subsidiarity principle is codified in the Code of Penal 
Procedure.227 Section 6 of the Strafgesetzbuch (StGB) applies German law to 
several acts committed abroad, inter alia, genocide and acts that are to be 
prosecuted by the terms of an international treaty binding on the Federal 
Republic of Germany, such as grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions, torture, and hostage taking.228 In order to adjust the German 
Penal Code to the Rome Statute of which Germany is a party, the CCAIL was 
legislated in June 2002. This act makes the core crimes in the ICC—genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes—offenses under German law.229 The 
subsidiarity principle is codified in §153f of the German Code of Criminal 
Procedure (Strafprozessordnung or StPO), which states that 
[T]he public prosecution shall dispense with prosecuting an offence 
punishable pursuant to VStGB §§6 to 14 if . . . the offence is being 
prosecuted before an international court or by a state on whose 
territory the offence was committed, whose national is suspected of 
its commission or whose national was harmed by the offense.230 
The subsidiarity clause does not address directly the ICC complementarity 
clause, but because “the Federal Constitution which provides that the general 
rules of public international law are part of the domestic legal order and have 
precedence over municipal laws,”231 it should be read and interpreted 
according to the ICC complementarity clause, as proven in the Abu Ghraib 
case. 
In 2004, the Center for Constitutional Rights in New York filed a criminal 
complaint against Donald H. Rumsfeld, then Secretary of Defense of the 
United States, and against others who were accused of participating in crimes 
according to the CCAIL, including torture and war crimes.232 The general 
prosecuting attorney decided to dismiss the complaint and not to open an 
 
 225 Id. at 143. 
 226 See id. 
 227 Id. at 142.  
 228 REYDAMS, supra note 13, at 144; EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra 
note 20, at 138–46.  
 229 REYDAMS, supra note 13, at 142–43.  
 230 STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], § 153f (Ger.).  
 231 REYDAMS, supra note 13, at 146. 
 232 Decision of the Prosecutor in a Complaint Against Rumsfeld et. al. Filed by the Center for 
Constitutional Rights, File No. 3 ARP 207/04 2 (Feb. 10, 2005), www.brusselstribunal.org/pdf/Rumsfeld 
Germany.pdf [hereinafter Decision of the Prosecutor]. 
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investigation against the accused, basing his decision on a consideration of the 
principle of subsidiarity as interpreted by the ICC complementarity clause.233 
The prosecutor explained that universal jurisdiction (referred to as “the world 
law principle”)234 “does not legitimize unlimited criminal prosecution,” and it 
should be applied “in the framework of non-interference in the affairs of 
foreign countries.”235 He based his inference on the ICC complementarity 
clause, which according to his analysis, “has to be seen in the context of the 
provisions of the CCAIL.”236 Therefore, he concluded that just as the “ICC can 
only be active if the nation-states first called upon to adjudicate are unwilling 
or unable to prosecute . . . a third state cannot examine the legal practice of 
foreign countries according to its own standards or correct or replace it in 
specific cases.”237 As a consequence, and since “no indications that the 
authorities and courts of the United States of America are refraining, or would 
refrain, from penal measures regarding the violations described in the 
complaint,” and considering the fact that “several proceedings have already 
been conducted against participant . . . the complaint must therefore be left to 
the judicial authorities of the United States of America.”238 
3. Spain 
Spanish jurisprudence is, so far in history, the most instructive for the 
application of the principle of subsidiarity in national universal jurisdiction 
laws. Before 2009, the Spanish Fundamental Law of the Judiciary authorized 
the Spanish legal system to apply absolute universal jurisdiction in some 
cases.239 It stipulated that Spain could prosecute offenses where a binding 
international treaty includes the obligation of exercising universal jurisdiction 
and required no Spanish nexus to those offenses.240 
In 2009, following some decisions of the Spanish courts aimed at limiting 
the application of universal jurisdiction in Spain,241 the law was amended so as 
 
 233 Id. sec. B. 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Id. 
 239 LEY ORGÁNICA DEL PODER JUDICIAL [L.O.P.J.] [Law on the Judiciary] art. 23 (Spain) [hereinafter 
Organic Law].  
 240 Id. art. 23(4). 
 241 See Naomi Roht-Arriaza, International Decisions—Guatemala Genocide Case, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 
207, 207 (2006) [hereinafter Guatemalan Genocide Case] (citing S.T.C., Sept. 26, 2005 (S.T.C., No. 237)); 
Cedric Ryngaert, Applying the Rome Statute’s Complementarity Principle: Drawing Lessons from the 
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to determine that unless international treaties or agreements request mandatory 
trial of the crimes under the universality principle, Spain’s universal 
jurisdiction should be limited and require some nexus to Spain, such as the 
presence of the accused in Spain; the passive personality principle, i.e., that the 
victims of the alleged offense have Spanish nationality; or the presence of 
another link of outstanding importance to Spain.242 This amendment also 
stipulated that Spanish courts could apply jurisdiction only in cases where 
another country or international tribunal had not begun a process involving an 
investigation and successful prosecution of such offenses; if another such 
process existed, then the Spanish court should suspend or stay its case until the 
other investigation and prosecution had concluded.243 
These amendments were preceded by several conflicting decisions of the 
Spanish courts regarding the question whether universality should be limited 
and under which conditions. The Guatemalan Genocide Case244 dealt with a 
complaint filed against Guatemalan officials allegedly responsible for crimes 
of terrorism, genocide, and summary executions perpetrated against 
Guatemala’s Mayan indigenous people and their supporters during the 1970s 
and the 1980s.245 The Spanish Constitutional Court’s landmark decision in this 
case supported broad universal jurisdiction and rejected former Spanish courts’ 
decisions on this case, which had subjected Spanish universal jurisdiction law 
to the subsidiarity principle.246 According to the decision of the Spanish 
Constitutional Court, neither nexus between Spain and the case nor proof of 
the impossibility of a trial in the territorial state was required to apply Spanish 
jurisdiction.247 Favoring the interests of preventing impunity and fearing that 
endorsing subsidiarity would put complainants in the “untenable position” of 
having to prove that they could not make a case in the territorial state, the 
constitutional court preferred a close-textual interpretation of the Spanish 
 
Prosecution of Core Crimes by States Acting Under the Universality Principle, 98 INST. INT’L L. 10 (2006) 
(discussing the effects of the Guatemalan Genocide Case on the Tibetan Genocide case). 
 242 See EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 20, at 238–39. 
 243 Article 23(4)(2) to the Organic law stipulates that “it has to be proved that no proceedings have been 
initiated in another competent country or an International Court leading to an investigation and effective 
prosecution of the offences.” Id. at 239. Furthermore, the criminal proceedings initiated under the Spanish 
jurisdiction “will be provisionally dismissed when there is evidence of the starting of other proceedings on the 
reported actions in the country or in the Court abovementioned.” Id.  
 244 Guatemalan Genocide Case, supra note 241.  
 245 Id. at 207.  
 246 See Ascensio, supra note 110 (discussing the decisions of the Second Chamber of the Spanish 
Supreme Tribunal and the Criminal Chamber of the Spanish National High Court).  
 247 Guatemalan Genocide Case, supra note 241, at 210.  
KHEN GALLEYSPROOFS2 12/14/2015 11:29 AM 
292 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30 
universal jurisdiction law. This determined a concurrence of jurisdiction and a 
hierarchy between the Spanish courts and the Guatemalan court in favor of the 
Spanish courts.248 
However, later decisions of Spanish courts followed a different trajectory 
and chose to subject Spanish courts’ jurisdiction to the principle of 
subsidiarity, which was, in turn, conditioned upon evidence that territorial 
courts and/or an international court were unwilling or unable to effectively 
investigate and prosecute the crimes referred to in the complaint.249 The 
“Tibetan Genocide” case emphasized that Spain could exercise universal 
jurisdiction over genocide committed in Tibet in the absence of a “national 
connection” with Spain. The National Court ordered the investigative judge to 
open an investigation because the complainants could adduce evidence that 
Chinese authorities failed to investigate the crimes and that the events 
complained of were outside the jurisdiction of the ICC.250 
In the Shehadeh Case, the Criminal Chamber of the Spanish National High 
Court analyzed the subsidiarity principle in light of the ICC’s complementarity 
clause.251 The Shehadeh Case inquired whether Spain had jurisdiction over a 
complaint against several high-ranking Israeli officials who were allegedly 
involved in a targeted killing operation executed on July 22, 2002 in the Gaza 
Strip.252 The operation was directed at the commander of the Hamas military 
wing in Gaza, Salah Shehadeh, and resulted in the deaths of Shehadeh and 
thirteen other civilians and the injuring of dozens of civilians in the vicinity.253 
In a decision on an appeal against the decision of the investigative judge on the 
matter, the National High Court determined that Spain had no jurisdiction over 
the case, inter alia, because of 
[T]he absence of the absolute nature of the principle of universal 
jurisdiction in Spain, in which the criterion of alternative jurisdiction 
is generally given priority over the criterion of concurrence, and . . . 
also [because] the former principle must be modulated in each case 
by logical rules of rationality, proportionality and self-restriction that 
 
 248 Id. 
 249 Ryngaert, supra note 241, at 10. 
 250 Id. at 10. 
 251 S.A.N., July 9, 2009 (R.G.D., No. 1/09) (Spain) [hereinafter Shehadeh Case].  
 252 Id. 
 253 Salah Shehadeh-Special Investigatory Commission, ISR. MINISTRY FOREIGN AFF. (Feb. 27, 2011), 
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/State/Law/Pages/Salah_Shehadeh-Special_Investigatory_Commission_27-
Feb-2011.aspx.  
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will facilitate its effective implementation in those cases in which the 
impunity of the possible abominable crimes committed is at risk.254 
The court compromised between subsidiarity and absolute universality, 
which, it deduced, rested, inter alia, on the nuances that national law, 
international law, and judicial decisions have added to the principle of 
universal justice.255 Among the sources that determine the nuances of the 
principle of universality, the court mentioned and cited the complementarity 
clause of the ICC, thus emphasizing the unwillingness and inability criteria.256 
Finally, in its consideration of the factors that should limit universality in 
the specific case before it, the court took the unwillingness and inability 
criteria into account only indirectly. The court gave up its jurisdiction because 
the case was being genuinely investigated by Israel.257 The court found that 
“there have been real actions, first administrative and then judicial, genuine 
action has been made, first, on the part of the government and then on the part 
of courts, to check whether an offense may have been committed.”258 It also 
emphasized the impartiality of the investigation committee for the case 
appointed by Israel and suggested that there was no ground to dispute the 
“organic and functional separation” between the investigating committee and 
Israeli legal authorities such as the Executive of the Israeli Military Advocate 
General and the Attorney General of the state.259 This analysis suggests that the 
court was convinced both of Israel’s genuine willingness to investigate the case 
and of its ability to do so; the impartiality of Israel’s legal system attested to 
both parameters of the complementarity clause. 
The Spanish National High Court’s discussion of the principle of 
subsidiarity in light of the ICC complementarity clause followed a former 
dispute between the Spanish courts over those principles, which is extrapolated 
from their decisions in the Guatemalan Genocide Case discussed above. While 
the Audencia Nacional (like the National High Court in the Shehadeh Case) 
conditioned the principle of subsidiarity on the inactivity of the territorial 
forum in a specific case,260 the majority opinion in the Supreme Tribunal’s 
 
 254 Shehadeh Case, supra note 251. 
 255 Id. 
 256 Id. 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id. 
 259 Id. 
 260 Guatemalan Genocide Case, supra note 241, at 208 (concluding that the Guatemalan court was not 
proven inactive).  
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decision of the Guatemalan Genocide Case rejected the idea that Spanish 
courts should evaluate the unwillingness and inability of other national courts. 
According to the majority opinion of the Supreme Tribunal, this task of 
evaluation was exclusively endowed to the ICC; national courts should avoid 
such an evaluation because it is an ultra vires act: they are not competent to 
judge the performance of other states’ legal systems. Furthermore, such 
evaluations interfere with international relations, an exclusive realm of the 
government of which the judiciary should be excluded.261 By contrast, the 
minority opinion of the Supreme Tribunal in the Guatemalan Genocide Case 
conditioned the Spanish courts’ subsidiarity to the territorial court on serious 
and reasonable evidence proving the inactivity of the territorial court.262 This 
was also the course of interpretation of the complementarity clause followed 
by the National High Court in the Shehade Case, as shown above. 
4. France 
Universal jurisdiction in France is codified in the Code of Criminal 
Procedure (CCP),263 providing for France’s universal jurisdiction over crimes 
that France has a duty to prosecute under international treaties.264 On August 9, 
2010, the law was amended to incorporate the Rome Statute into French 
legislation, so that France’s obligations under its universal jurisdiction law now 
include the duty to pursue any suspected criminal of war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, or genocide.265 
The amendment of the CCP also demanded that France’s universal 
jurisdiction be limited by the residence of the suspect in France, the general 
prosecutor’s exclusive authority to begin an investigation, double criminality 
(i.e., that the conduct is considered a crime under the legislation both of the 
state where the offense was committed and of France) and by subsidiarity 
 
 261 Ascensio, supra note 110, at 694. 
 262 Id. at 695. 
 263 CODE DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE [C. PR. PEN.] [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE] (Fr.). 
 264 Id. arts. 696-4, 698-11. 
 265 Id. Formerly, the U.N. Security Council Resolutions that determined the establishment of the 
international criminal tribunals in Rwanda and former Yugoslavia were incorporated in French law so as to 
order France’s obligation to pursue any suspected criminal of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and 
genocide if committed in the former Yugoslavia or in Rwanda, when the suspect is present on French territory. 
See EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 20, at 131.  
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either to the ICC266 or to other states that have jurisdiction over the case and 
seek the suspect’s extradition.267 
Among the preconditions that forbid extradition to another state competing 
for jurisdiction, the CCP includes the following: 
Where the offence for which the extradition has been requested is 
punished by the law of the requesting state which imposes a penalty 
or a safety measure contrary to French public policy; 
Where the requested person would be tried in the requesting state by 
a court which does not provide fundamental procedural guarantees 
and protect for the rights of the defence.268 
A comparison of the subsidiarity clause in the French legislation with the 
ICC complementarity clause suggests that the French legislation does not 
consider either the competing state’s ability to apply its jurisdiction or (at least 
directly) its willingness. It rather focuses on the demand that the competing 
state “regard the principles of due process recognized by international law.”269 
It also gives substantial importance to the procedural demands of the French 
law by denying extradition in cases in which the legislation of the requesting 
state determines a punishment or a security measure that contradicts the French 
public order.270 
An example of how the French law subsidiarity clause focuses on the 
international law principles of due process can be seen in a request that was 
filed to a French court to extradite to Rwanda a Rwandan citizen who was 
alleged to have committed crimes against humanity and genocide.271 The 
Chamber of Instruction of the Court of Appeal of Toulouse based its decision 
not to extradite on deficiencies in the criminal process in Rwanda that 
infringed upon the defendant’s rights for due process. First, the court 
determined that the Rwandan law would be applied retroactively, in contrast to 
the basic principle of international criminal law forbidding retroactive 
criminalization. Second, the equality of arms principle (i.e., that the defense 
and the prosecution can equally perform their duties) was jeopardized because 
 
 266 EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 20, at 131.  
 267 Id. at 132. 
 268 CODE DE PROCÉDURE PÉNALE [C. PR. PEN.] [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 696-4 (Fr.). 
 269 Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 17(2). It can be argued that a state that does not apply the principles 
of due process recognized by international law is deemed unwilling to conduct genuine criminal proceedings. 
Nevertheless, this is not necessarily the case. 
 270 CODE DE PROCEDURE PENALE [C. PR. PEN.] [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CODE] art. 696-4. (Fr.). 
 271 See Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Toulouse, Oct. 23, 2008, 2008/00029. 
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the lack of means of protection for defense witnesses would have prevented the 
defense from presenting all of the protecting evidence it had. Third, the 
sentence that was expected to be imposed on the accused—twenty years of 
isolation—was considered by the French legal system to be a degrading and 
humiliating sentence.272 
To conclude the general part of this Article, in the last decade the doctrine 
of universal jurisdiction has been entrenched by national courts and national 
legislation that aim to expand the jurisdiction of national courts. This was 
achieved by a revision of national laws to comply with states’ obligations 
under the Rome Statute and the ad hoc international criminal tribunals to 
prevent impunity from the perpetrators of international core crimes.273 
However, the application of the doctrine of universal jurisdiction has been 
mitigated by the principle of complementarity, according to which national 
courts of foreign states will yield firstly before national courts of territorial 
states and secondly before the ICC or other international tribunals.274 
Nevertheless, those foreign national courts will not avoid applying their 
jurisdiction in cases where the former courts could not pursue genuine criminal 
procedures. As illustrated through the discussion of state practice, states that 
have universal jurisdiction laws carefully examine whether the terms of 
subsidiarity have been fulfilled, and only in such circumstances do they avoid 
exerting universal jurisdiction. 
In the following section of this Article, I examine the implications of these 
conclusions for the Syrian case. Beginning with an analysis of the emergence 
of the Syrian state and the Ba’ath regime’s take-over, I proceed with a review 
of the tensions among Syria’s various religious and ethnic sects. Finally, in an 
overview of the evolution of the 2011 uprising, I discuss the question of 
whether and under what circumstances foreign national courts should apply the 
principle of mitigated universal jurisdiction to adjudicate the perpetrators of 
international core crimes during the bloody conflict in Syria. It should be noted 
that a thorough analysis of the sociological and historical reasons for the 
emergence of the 2011 uprising in Syria is beyond the scope of this Article. I 
will focus more on the dynamics of Syrian society before and during the 
uprising in order to assess the implications of its cohesive and divisive forces 
 
 272 Id. 
 273 See Sriram, supra note 49, at 364. 
 274 See, e.g., Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Toulouse, Oct. 23, 2008, 2008/00029. See 
generally Decision of the Prosecutor, supra note 232. 
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on its ability to conduct criminal legal procedures for perpetrators of 
international core crimes. 
IV. THE SYRIAN CASE 
A. The Syrian Society: Between Factionalism and Cohesion from the French 
Mandate to the 2011 Uprising 
The Syrian state, now called the Syrian Arab Republic, underwent several 
formative stages before it finally emerged with its current borders. It was first 
established as a kingdom by the Hashemite Emir Faysal with British help 
between October 1918 and July 1920, following the destruction of the Ottoman 
Empire.275 This kingdom was dismantled by France, which in 1920 was 
assigned the mandate of some parts of Syria by the League of Nations and 
established several states there—Greater Lebanon and a number of small states 
that included a Druze and an Alawi state.276 In 1925, the French re-established 
a Syrian state through the merger of Damascus and Aleppo, but the Alawi and 
the Druze277 areas remained separated from this state, in practical terms, until 
1945,278 a year before the Syrian state emerged to gain its independence.279 
The process of the emergence of the state of Syria thus has the fractures in 
Syria’s “mosaic society” folded within it,280 i.e., the division between the 
different sects in Syria and their struggle over power.281 The Druze and the 
Alawis are the most evident minorities in Syria,282 but Syria is also religiously 
divided between Islamic Sunnis, who form the largest religious group in Syria, 
 
 275 Itamar Rabinovich, The Compact Minorities and the Syrian State, 1918–45, 14 J. CONTEMP. H. 693, 
695 (1979). 
 276 Id. 
 277 See id. at 693–94 (referring to the Alawi and the Druze as the “compact minorities”). 
 278 Id. at 695–96. In 1936, an attempt was made to incorporate the Druze and the Alawi areas into the 
Syrian state under a special status but this attempt failed and the merger was suspended in 1939. See id. at 696. 
 279 Id. 
 280 Raymond Hinnebusch, Modern Syrian Politics, 6 H. COMPASS 263, 276 (2008) [hereinafter 
Hinnebusch, Modern Syrian Politics]. 
 281 See generally AJAMI, supra note 2, at 111–34; NIKOLAOS VAN DAM, THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN 
SYRIA (2011).  
 282 The Alawis constitute twelve percent of the Syrian population. See Daniel Pipes, The Alawi Capture of 
Power in Syria, 25 MIDDLE E. STUD. 429, 430–32 (1989). Their religious doctrines derive from the Twelver or 
Imami branch of Shi’i Islam, but they reject the Shari’a (Islam’s sacred law) and are therefore considered non-
Muslims. See id.; see also AJAMI, supra note 2, at 15–17. The Druze, who constitute three percent of the 
Syrian society, are also a “radical Shiite sect.” See VAN DAM, supra note 281; Rabinovich, supra note 275, at 
693. 
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Isma’ilis (1.5 percent), and Christians (14.1 percent).283 Ethnically, it is divided 
between Syrian Arabs (around seventy-four percent), Kurds (8.5 percent), 
Armenians (four percent), Turcomans (three percent), and Circassians, who 
constitute the smallest ethnic minority.284 Another line of sectarianism is the 
class division “between the ruling landed and commercial oligarchy, a rising 
radical middle class . . . and an aggrieved peasantry.”285 
All of the above fractures played a role in reshaping the state of Syria, 
which continued after Syria gained its independence and until the coup of 
1963, when the Ba’ath party gained rule over Syria.286 From 1946 to 1963, the 
government was composed of the Sunnis, and especially the urban Sunni 
elite.287 Eventually, the Sunnis’ success in eliminating the Alawi state and the 
integration of this state within Syria contributed to the Alawis’ “rapid rise to 
power.”288 The Sunnis’ resentment of the Alawis has not prevented the latter’s 
over-representation in the army,289 which was one of the two key factors that 
paved the way for the Alawis to take control of the government in Syria.290 The 
second factor was the Ba’ath party, which the Alawis took over in February 
1963 in a coup that enabled the Ba’ath coup d’état of March 1963 and the 
Assad coup of November 1970.291 The Ba’ath coup started as a reform coup 
and led to a substantial change in the composition of the elite (forming a new 
rural elite involved in the social and national struggles of the 1950s)292 and in 
the regime’s legitimacy basis (based on nationalism, modernization, and 
institutional design). This latter change, in turn, led to a transformation of 
social structure.293 
 
 283 ZAKIR HUSSAIN, INDIAN COUNCIL OF WORLD AFFAIRS, ISSUE BRIEF: POST-ASSAD GEOSTRATEGIC 
POSSIBILITIES 3 (2012), http://www.icwa.in/pdfs/IBpostassad.pdf. 
 284 VAN DAM, supra note 281, at 1. 
 285 Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria: From Authoritarian Upgrading to Revolution?, 88 INT’L AFF. 95, 96 
(2012) [hereinafter Hinnebusch, Syria: From Authoritarian Upgrading to Revolution?]. 
 286 See generally VAN DAM, supra note 281. The Ba’ath rule persisted until the 2011 uprising and in fact 
has not completely lost control in Syria. Id.  
 287 Pipes, supra note 282, at 440. Between 1958 and 1961 Syria created a political union with Egypt, 
called “the United Arab Republic” in order to revive the Arab nation. The merger ended in 1961 when Syria 
withdrew from the union. For a discussion of the union and its failure, see Monte Palmer, The United Arab 
Republic an Assessment of Its Failure, 20 MIDDLE E. J. 50, 50 (1966). 
 288 Pipes, supra note 282, at 440. 
 289 The Sunnis ignored the army as a tool of state and believed that reserving the top positions for 
themselves in the army would suffice to control the military forces. See id. at 440–41; AJAMI, supra note 2, at 
24–25. 
 290 Pipes, supra note 282, at 440. 
 291 Id. at 442. 
 292 Hinnebusch, Syria: From Authoritarian Upgrading to Revolution?, supra note 285, at 96. 
 293 Hinnebusch, Modern Syrian Politics, supra note 280, at 268. 
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This revolution was developed and deepened by the authoritarian regime of 
Hafiz al-Assad. Raymond Hinnebusch observes that al-Assad created a stable 
regime294 “through the lens of neo-patrimonialism [and] the concentration of 
power in the regime through the construction of clientele networks around the 
presidency.”295 Al-Assad managed to create a “‘loyalty system’ under 
which . . . elites were given license to enrich themselves and thereby were 
‘implicated’ in the regime.”296 Hinnebusch suggests that Al-Assad’s successful 
efforts to consolidate Syria were enabled by a “dark side,”297 referring both to 
“the mafia-like clans . . . whose corruption and smuggling undermined state 
policy”298 and to the role of repression in regime consolidation—a repression 
created through an army made up of “guard units recruited from [Assad’s] kin 
and sect that defended the regime”299 and through the pervasive public 
surveillance in Syria as a mukharabat (intelligence) state.300 
Economic factors and liberalization reforms also contributed to the stability 
of al-Assad’s regime.301 The revolution enabled rapid social mobility for the 
lower classes, “especially from the villages and minorities,”302 and 
consolidated an alliance between “Alawi power brokers and the Damascene 
Sunni merchant class” (a “military-mercantilist complex,” as one commentator 
called it).303 The regime went through several cycles of liberalization in its 
economy, resulting in a greater scope for the private sector.304 Yet, the 
economic liberalization was followed by only limited political liberalization, 
“amounting to a mere decompression of authoritarian controls and greater 
access for the bourgeoisie to decision-makers,”305 and did not develop as a 
stage towards democratization.306 These processes of liberalization led civil 
 
 294 That stability was slightly shaken in the 1980’s when an Islamic revolution from within was attempted, 
but eventually was repressed by al-Assad’s regime. See id. at 270; AJAMI, supra note 2, at 84; Eyal Zisser, 
Syria, the Ba’th Regime and the Islamic Movement: Stepping on a New Path?, 95 MUSLIM WORLD 43, 47 
(2005). 
 295 Hinnebusch, Modern Syrian Politics, supra note 280, at 269. 
 296 Id. 
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society to demand democratization after the death of Hafiz al-Assad, but their 
aspirations were soon repressed by Hafiz’s successor, his son, Bashar al-
Assad.307 
Bashar al-Assad followed the path his father had paved but intended to 
“upgrade” his authoritarian regime.308 At the start of his rule, Bashar “was 
popular as a modernizer with the public, especially with the younger 
generation, and hence represented both continuity and change.”309 Bashar’s 
intentions were to “foster modernizing cadres” and to increase reforms in state 
institutions to limit corruption and waste by promoting economic, cultural, and 
technological liberalization (even if to a limited extent).310 However, these 
have currently failed, contributing to the debilitation of the regime through the 
2011 uprising.311 
The reasons for Bashar’s failure are rooted in the sectarianism of Syrian 
society.312 Because Syria lacks a distinct national identity, the Ba’ath regime 
consolidated the Syrian society and bridged its sectarian ruptures through the 
ideology of Arabism.313 “Arguably, Arab nationalism was the most successful 
ideology in filling the post-Ottoman identity vacuum” because it bridged the 
cleavages between the factions in the Syrian Arabic-speaking populations.314 
For the Ba’ath, it was a means for overcoming its political competitors—on the 
one hand, the Syrian Social National Party, and on the other hand, the religious 
alternative of the Muslim Brotherhood.315 
However, in order for the Ba’ath to continue its hold on Syrian society 
through the ideology of nationalism,316 it had to preserve its social basis, a 
mission that Bashar failed to achieve.317 Bashar’s initiated reforms were 
 
 307 Hinnebusch, Modern Syrian Politics, supra note 280, at 274. 
 308 Hinnebusch, Syria: From Authoritarian Upgrading to Revolution?, supra note 285, at 95. 
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Upgrading to Revolution?, supra note 285, at 96. 
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accompanied by his restructuring of the regime’s social base by abandoning 
the “old guard” and “retir[ing] the older generation.”318 The Ba’ath ideology 
was hence neglected; however, “no bourgeois party arose to organize 
supporters of [Bashar’s] neo-liberalism.”319 Moreover, other ideologies were 
competing for power, especially Islamist.320 Bashar tried to foster moderate 
Islam in order to prevent the emergence of more radical currents and to tame 
secular opposition to his regime.321 His efforts were focused on controlling and 
taming Islam.322 In this way, although he allowed the incorporation of Islamist 
representatives into parliament and assured the ulema,323 the economic 
freedom to manage Islamic financial institutions, he did not allow Islamists to 
be fully politically incorporated or to participate in free elections.324 
This exclusion of the Islamists from fully participating in politics illustrates 
Bashar’s aversion to democracy in Syria and his inflexible attitude to the 
activities of human rights organizations.325 Even though Bashar’s first year of 
ruling, known as “the Damascus Spring,” allowed for economic reforms and 
openness to the West—including the establishment of human rights 
organizations, civic forums, and even the release of political prisoners—this 
period ended with the arrest of large numbers of human rights activists during 
summer and autumn of 2001.326 Because of the “exceptional thirst of the 
Syrian middle class for freedom,”327 however, a majority of Syrian 
oppositional groups, parties, and independents signed the Damascus 
Declaration in 2005, demanding gradual democratic reform.328 Twelve figures 
leading this initiative were sentenced to serve time in prison in 2008, and no 
one else stepped forward to oppose Bashar until 2011.329 
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The 2011 Syrian uprising started as a civil rebellion motivated by the 
demand for political rights and civil liberties for the Syrian people.330 In March 
2011, a group of young children in Dar’a were arrested and brutally tortured 
for writing graffiti against the regime. Non-violent protests against the regime 
broke out, gradually spreading to other towns and villages,331 and soon became 
a nationwide uprising against the regime.332 Facing the regime’s harsh military 
reaction to the civil demonstrations, the struggle evolved into a military 
insurgency, initially with the establishment of the Free Syrian Army in July 
2011.333 The struggle later saw the emergence of other rebel militia alliances, 
such as the Syrian Islamic Liberation Front, the Syrian Islamic Front, and the 
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), mainly religious groups expressing 
different interpretations of Sunni Islamist ideology and whose motivations for 
the struggle differ from those of the original demonstrators.334 The Kurds also 
formed a militia group called the Democratic Union Party, which is a Syrian 
Kurdish franchise of the PKK organization.335 
For the purpose of this Article, it is important to inquire into the rebel 
groups’ and demonstrators’ motivations for initiating the struggle, as well as 
their aspirations for the future of Syria. Equally important is the question of the 
level of cohesiveness and unification that could be created between the 
different rebel groups. 
In contrast to the above description of Syria as a divided and sectarian state, 
the prominent speakers of the coalition of committees formed by the 
opposition to the regime inside and outside of Syria336 resist the view of Syria 
as a mosaic society.337 They intend to defeat the regime’s strategy of “‘divide 
 
 330 Ismail, supra note 2, at 542; Lungren-Jörum, supra note 2, at 13; AJAMI, supra note 2, at 10–13. 
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and rule’ . . . [which] perpetuated social antagonism and resentment along 
sectarian and ethnic lines.”338 Their vision for the future of Syria is of a unified 
Syrian people and a sense of solidarity, and they motivate a dialogue among 
Syrians of all backgrounds and religious affiliations.339 They view future Syria 
as a civil, democratic state, possibly with an Islamic reference depending on 
the outcomes of elections.340 They insist that the uprising is against “the rule of 
a certain family” and not against a sect (i.e., the Alawi sect).341 As Burhan 
Ghalioun states, “every individual member” of the National Syrian Council342 
“represents the entire Syrian people, not just people who happen to share his or 
her background.”343 
However, the unifying a-sectarian vision described above does not 
necessarily reflect the reality on the ground. Since the late 1920s Syria has 
been described as “a country . . . [which] militated against national unity and 
the formation of patriotic sentiment.”344 As Fouad Ajami observes, “[the] lines 
of sect and community had not gone away and that world in Greater Syria . . . 
had not found a way out of the hold of sectarianism.”345 The Syrian opposition 
thus faces practical realpolitik challenges. Despite its aspirations for creating a 
national unity government,346 the opposition’s disparity and the difficulties it 
has had joining up its forces have long been known.347 With the evolution of 
the uprising into an armed conflict between the regime and armed groups, 
more groups and ideological currents have occupied territories and want to 
enforce their own perception of the Syrian state.348 Moreover, and despite the 
opposition’s welcoming attitude towards the Alawis, the regime’s long-years 
protection of this sect together with the Alawis’ sense of persecution might 
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very well result in the Alawis remaining loyal to Bashar al-Assad. As an 
Alawite writer using the pseudonym Khudr has stated: “[T]he Alawis lack [a] 
sense of confidence and belonging . . . They will have to “fight to the end” and 
stay with the Assads, doubts and all.” 349 
The opposition groups, therefore, understand that the fear that “Syria’s 
diverse religious groups . . . would retrench to positions based on narrow 
communal identities”350 might actualize. As a consequence, the opposition, in 
the struggle for the future of Syria, aims at overcoming the tensions between 
the concept of an inclusive nation and the promotion of a civic identity of 
equal rights and obligations on the one hand, and the need to take into account 
and incorporate distinct, communally based practices and relations on the other 
hand.351 Considering the evolution of the struggle, the increasing number of 
radical religious groups, and the current geographical division of Syria as more 
groups occupy various territories, there remains the question of whether the 
pioneering demonstrators’ utopian vision of unity will ever be realized. In 
addition, the question of the level of cohesiveness that will be achieved at the 
end of civil war will have implications for this society’s ability and willingness 
to bring perpetrators of international core crimes to justice. In the following 
subsection, I assess the possible answers to these questions. 
B. Universal Jurisdiction or Local Justice in Syria? 
At the time of the writing of this Article, the international community was 
not pursuing criminal charges against perpetrators of international core crimes 
in Syria.352 But when the conflict is militarily resolved and Syrian society 
reconstructs itself, this situation may change. The ICC will likely be prevented 
from intervening because it will not have jurisdiction ratione loci and ratione 
personae, and the U.N. Security Council will also likely be paralyzed by 
Chinese and Russian vetoes. 
However, universal jurisdiction may be applied by foreign national courts 
under the following conditions. First, when the conflict ends with the victory 
of one or more of the fighting armies, organizations, or militias, persons who 
belong to the defeated force or forces may flee Syria. Some of these may be 
 
 349 AJAMI, supra note 2, at 124. 
 350 Ismail, supra note 2, at 540. 
 351 Id. at 545. 
 352 As noted above, an initiative to pass the situation to the ICC failed because of the Chinese and Russian 
vetoes in the U.N. Security Council. Russia and China Veto UN Move to Refer Syria to ICC, BBC NEWS (May 
22, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27514256.  
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perpetrators of international core crimes such as torture or war crimes. 
Therefore, the states that are parties to the 1949 Geneva Conventions353 and the 
Convention Against Torture354 will have to obey their obligations according to 
these conventions to either prosecute or extradite those persons.355 
Second, internal post-conflict rebuilding of Syrian society, including 
processes of reforms and changes, will affect the measures taken by the 
international community regarding criminal procedures. The military 
resolution of the conflict in Syria will undoubtedly be insufficient to rebuild 
and restore Syria as a state in terms of either the cohesion of its civil society or 
its functioning as a political entity among the states of the international 
community. To achieve these goals, Syrian society will likely have to undergo 
a process of transitional justice, in the course of which the outcomes of the 
painful conflict can be processed in several ways.356 Syrian society may turn to 
reconciliation mechanisms such as truth commissions357 or to local 
idiosyncratic procedures of justice, such as the Gacaca courts in Rwanda.358 It 
may otherwise decide to pursue criminal procedures against perpetrators of 
international core crimes. Or it can follow both trajectories—that is, apply both 
reconciliation and criminal justice procedures. 
If the new post-conflict regime in Syria decides to pursue criminal 
procedures, it may apply Syria’s obligations under the Convention Against 
Torture or the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and either prosecute or extradite 
persons responsible for the crimes of torture and war crimes. It may also use its 
own criminal system to pursue criminal charges against perpetrators of other 
 
 353 Geneva Convention III, supra note 98. 
 354 Convention Against Torture, supra note 100. 
 355 See Geneva Conventions I–IV, supra note 98.  
 356 In the last decade there has been extensive writing on transitional justice. See, e.g., Oskar N.T. Thoms 
et al., State-Level Effects of Transitional Justice: What Do We Know?, 4 INT. J. TRANSITIONAL JUST. 329 
(2010); Lisa J. Laplante & Kimberly Theison, Transitional Justice in Times of Conflict: Colombia’s Ley de 
Justicia y Paz, 28 MICH. J. INT’L L. 49 (2006-2007); TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: 
BEYOND TRUTH VERSUS JUSTICE (Naomi Roht-Arriaza & Javier Mariezcurrena eds., 2006); RUTI G. TEITEL, 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (Oxford Univ. Press 2000).  
 357 For a discussion of the process of truth commissions and examples of such processes throughout the 
world, see, for example, PRISCILLA B. HAYNER,  UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE 
CHALLENGE OF TRUTH (2d ed., 2010); TERESA GODWIN PHELPS, SHATTERED VOICES: LANGUAGE, VIOLENCE, 
AND THE WORK OF TRUTH COMMISSIONS (2004); Susan Kemp, The Inter-Relatioship Between Guatemalan 
Commission for Historical Clarification and the Search for Justice in National Courts, 15 CRIM. L. FORUM 67, 
67–72 (2004). 
 358 See, e.g., PHIL CLARK, THE GACACA COURTS, POST GENOCIDE JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION IN 
RWANDA: JUSTICE WITHOUT LAWYERS (2010); Tully L. Danielle, Human Rights Compliance and the Gacaca 
Jurisdictions in Rwanda, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 385 (2003). 
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international core crimes. Under such circumstances, foreign national courts 
willing to apply their universal jurisdiction laws will have to examine whether 
the terms of the subsidiarity principle are fulfilled. This examination will 
determine whether those states should apply their jurisdiction or waive it. In 
the following analysis of the parameters of subsidiarity, I assess post-conflict 
Syria’s willingness and ability to pursue criminal procedures against 
perpetrators of international core crimes. 
The key parameter for such assessment is the independence of the judicial 
system.359 The minimum standards for judicial independence include a judicial 
system that is impartial,360 and impartiality is one of the indicators of a 
willingness to pursue criminal procedures in good faith.361 In addition, an 
independent judicial system is viewed as not experiencing a substantial or total 
collapse of its institutions and therefore able to undertake prosecutions.362 
Applying these parameters of willingness and ability on the post-conflict 
judicial system in Syria reveals that Syria will not be independent, and hence 
will neither be able nor willing to perform criminal investigations and 
prosecutions. As discussed above, the inability of a state to pursue criminal 
procedures suggests a substantial collapse and unavailability of the judicial 
system.363 This is most apparently the case for judicial systems of “states 
emerging from conflict, in which infrastructure and resources have been 
destroyed or are unavailable.”364 It is also the case for: “1. [s]tates entangled in 
conflict- either domestic or international, 2. [s]tates experiencing political 
unrest or economic crisis, [and] States in transition.”365 In these situations, the 
judicial and other bureaucratic systems of the state may suffer a shock that 
would render them ineffective. Furthermore, violations of rights and disrespect 
for the rule of law may threaten the independence of the judicial system. 
Finally, procedures of reform and transition to new governments may render 
the judicial system unavailable and therefore unable to carry out criminal 
procedures against the perpetrators of international core crimes.366 All of these 
descriptions match the current conflict in Syria and indicate that Syria would 
most likely be unable to carry out criminal proceedings. 
 
 359 Ellis, supra note 144, at 237. 
 360 Id.  
 361 Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 17(2)(c).  
 362 Ellis, supra note 144, at 238. 
 363 Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 17(3). 
 364 Ellis, supra note 144, at 237. 
 365 Id. at 238. 
 366 Id. at 238–39. 
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In addition, even when the judicial system in Syria overcomes the legal and 
bureaucratic chaos created by the conflict, there still remains the question of its 
willingness to perform criminal procedures in good faith. The sectarian trends 
that have characterized Syria since its establishment and which also laid the 
foundation for the current conflict, although denied by some leading figures of 
the opposition,367 may jeopardize the new regime’s ability to conduct genuine 
criminal procedures. It will be difficult to secure the rights of defendants that 
are not influenced by resentment against one sect or another, especially when 
members of some of the sects are responsible for the grievous outcomes of war 
crimes and crimes against humanity. 
Indeed, the level of implementation of international standards of human 
rights is another factor that will have a crucial impact on the independence of 
Syria’s judicial system and, as a consequence, on Syria’s ability and 
willingness to pursue criminal proceedings. As some scholars suggest, the 
application of international standards of human rights is part of the due process 
of law.368 Therefore, the unavailability of a state’s judicial system also covers 
its lack of implementation of international standards on procedural 
requirements.369 This is because in such cases the national judicial system will 
not be able “to provide justice in the case.”370 
It is, therefore, obvious that judicial systems of states such as monarchies 
and dictatorships that ignore the basic principles that are fundamental to the 
rule of law371 render their systems unavailable with regard to pursuing criminal 
procedures against perpetrators of international core crimes.372 According to 
the analysis suggested below, the Syrian legal system currently suffers from 
such deficiencies, and is likely to continue to do so when the conflict ends.373 
 
 367 See Lungren-Jörum, supra note 2; Ismail, supra note 2, at 540–41, 543. 
 368 KLEFFNER, supra note 87, at 157. On the duty of states applying universal jurisdiction to comply with 
internationally recognized fair trial standards, see Kreβ, supra note 16, at 581–84. 
 369 KLEFFNER, supra note 87, at 157. 
 370 See id.  
 371 See, e.g., Ellis, supra note 144, at 238–69; Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 67.  
 372 Ellis, supra note 144, at 239.  
 373 For examples of the Syrian judicial system’s poor respect for international human rights standards, see 
generally DAMASCUS CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS STUDIES, ALTERNATIVE REPORT TO THE SYRIAN 
GOVERNMENT’S INITIAL REPORT ON MEASURES TO FULFILL ITS COMMITMENTS UNDER THE CONVENTION 
AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT (2010), 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CAT/Shared%20Documents/SYR/INT_CAT_NGO_SYR_48_10106_E.pdf
; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, FAR FROM JUSTICE: SYRIA’S SUPREME STATE SECURITY COURT (2009), http://www. 
hrw.org/reports/2009/02/23/far-justice-0 [hereinafter FAR FROM JUSTICE]. 
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Due to the Syrian Republic’s establishment through the French Mandate, 
French law has had crucial influence over Syria’s legal system, including 
criminal law.374 Nevertheless, and even though the Shari’a (i.e., Islamic law) is 
not the formal law in Syria,375 Shari’a is stated in the constitution as a major 
source of law in Syria.376 This system remained in force after the Ba’ath party 
coup of 1963 that turned Syria into a secular unitary republic.377 In 2012, Syria 
adopted a constitution that made it a semi-presidential republic.378 
However, in practice, the Syrian authoritarian regime’s379 commitment to 
basic international legal standards of due process of law and fundamental 
human rights is very limited.380 Syria was one of the Arab states that affirmed 
the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights in the U.N. General 
Assembly381 and is a member of the 1966 Covenants on Human Rights.382 
Nevertheless, the Syrian Constitution makes treaty law binding domestically in 
Syria “only when new legislation to that effect is promulgated,”383 and 
subsequent statutes prevail over treaties in cases of conflict of laws.384 In 
addition, in practice, and as a consequence of the mukharabat state established 
by the al-Assads,385 several fundamental human rights are very poorly 
observed in Syria. For example, the rights of prisoners are not strictly 
respected,386 military courts are employed to suppress dissent,387 and even 
 
 374 Jacques el-Hakim, Syria, 1 Y.B. ISLAMIC & MIDDLE E. L. 142, 152 (1994). 
 375 An exception is the application of Muslim law to govern the Muslim community in matters of family 
law and succession. See id. at 148. 
 376 Article 3 of the Syrian Constitution determines that “Islamic jurisprudence is a main source of 
legislation.” This Article was maintained in the revised Syrian Constitution of 2012. CONSTITUTION OF THE 
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC Feb. 26, 2012, art. 3.  
 377 Hinnebusch, Syria: From Authoritarian Upgrading to Revolution?, supra note 285, at 96. 
 378 See CONSTITUTION OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, supra note 376.  
 379 See Reinoud Leenders, Authoritarianism and the Judiciary in Syria: Regime Resilience and 
Implications for Judicial Reform Assistance, at 13 (Knowledge Programme Civil Soc’y in W. Asia, Working 
Paper No. 17, 2010); Hinnebusch, Syria: From Authoritarian Upgrading to Revolution?, supra note 285, at 96. 
See generally Annette Büchs, The Resilience of Authoritarian Rule in Syria Under Hafez and Bashar Al-Assad 
(Ger. Inst. of Glob. and Area Studies (GIGA), Working Paper No. 97, 2009). 
 380 See supra note 373 and accompanying text. 
 381 Donna E. Arzt, The Application of International Human Rights Law in Islamic States, 12 HUM. RTS. 
Q. 202, 216 (1990). 
 382 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 383 Arzt, supra note 381, at 221. 
 384 Id. at 222.  
 385 See Hinnebusch, Modern Syrian Politics, supra note 280 and accompanying text. 
 386 AMNESTY INT’L, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 2014/2015: SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC (2015); FAR 
FROM JUSTICE, supra note 373, at 12–13. 
 387 Arzt, supra note 381, at 226.  
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though the constitution determines the independence of the judiciary, scholars 
have observed the opposite to be true.388 It should also be mentioned that Syria 
does not object to capital punishment, as this kind of punishment is not 
proscribed by Shari’a.389 This fact alone, however, would not render the Syrian 
legal system unable to provide justice in a case. Despite the facts that the Rome 
Statute does not include capital punishment390 and that international human 
rights law tends to prescribe its abolition,391 this type of punishment is not 
formally proscribed by international human rights law. Therefore, the meting 
out of capital punishment to perpetrators of international core crimes would not 
necessarily evoke the parameters of unwillingness and inability.392 
Truly, the opposition’s vision of the future Syrian state is of a civil 
democratic state with prominence for human rights. However, the questions 
are, first, whether the civic forces including human rights activists and forums 
that initiated the uprising will have the upper hand at the end of the conflict, 
and second, whether they will be able to realize their plans given the 
underlying preconditions of the post-conflict state and society. If they fail in 
 
 388 Id. at 206–07; Leenders, supra note 379, at 7. 
 389 William A. Schabas, Islam and the Death Penalty, 9 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 223, 231–34 (2000-
2001). 
 390 Rome Statute, supra note 21, art. 77 (determining that “the Court may impose one of the following 
penalties on a person convicted of a crime under Article 5 of [the] Statute: (a) Imprisonment for a specified 
number of years, which may not exceed a maximum of 30 years; or (b) A term of life imprisonment when 
justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person.”) 
 391 See, e.g., The Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Dec. 15, 1989; The Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish the Death Penalty, June 
8, 1990; Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty as Amended by Protocol No. 11, May 11,1994, E.T.S.155; Pro-
tocol No. 13 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Jan. 
9, 2003; Human Rights Committee, General Comment 20, Article 7 (Forty-fourth Session, 1992), Compilation 
of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1, at 30 (1994).  
 392 Note, for example, that when capital punishment was meted out to Saddam Hussein by the Iraqi 
Special Tribunal, the U.N. Secretary General, Ban Ki Moon, supported the court’s decision and stated that “the 
issue of capital punishment is for each and every Member State to decide.” See Ban Ki-Moon Takes Over as 
UN Secretary-General, Calls for Common Action to Face Crises, U.N. NEWS CTR. (Jan. 2, 2007), http://www. 
un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=21137#.VAsNqD_lp9A. For an English summary of the Appeals Court’s 
decision, see RAID AL-SAEDI, SUMMARY OF THE VERDICT OF 1991 CASE (2010), http://law.case.edu/ 
Academics/AcademicCenters/Cox/GrotianMomentBlog/documents/1991IHTverdict.pdf. Nevertheless, the 
fairness of the trial’s proceedings, including the legality of the punishment inflicted upon Hussein according to 
international law, was criticized by other jurists and scholars. See, e.g., SONYA SCEATS, THE TRIAL OF 
SADDAM HUSSEIN (2005), https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/ 
International%20Law/bptrialhussein.pdf. Sceats mentions that “because of the death penalty, European 
investigators have reportedly refused to contribute to mass grave excavations and a number of states have 
declined to commit funds to the Court.” Id.  
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realizing their vision, then it is more likely that Syria will be considered 
unwilling and unable to perform genuine criminal proceedings against the 
perpetrators of international core crimes. Foreign national courts of states that 
legislated universal jurisdiction laws, such as those described in Part III of this 
Article, will have legal authorization to apply these laws. 
CONCLUSION 
More than a decade after the Princeton Principles and almost a decade after 
the Institut de Droit International resolution on universal jurisdiction, this 
concept has been and still serves as a prominent tool for the international 
community to prevent impunity from the perpetrators of international core 
crimes. In this Article, I examined the development of the concept of universal 
jurisdiction in order to assess its application to the post-Syrian civil war case. 
My analysis supports the concept of universal jurisdiction and its crucial 
role in preventing impunity and securing justice. However, because universal 
jurisdiction in its absolute version jeopardizes the interests of societies in 
transition (such as their ability to reconstruct themselves on foundations that 
secure justice for their members), I argued that the concept of mitigated 
universal jurisdiction, expressed through the complementarity principle (also 
referred to as subsidiarity), can bypass this obstacle in a way that both secures 
the values of preventing impunity and strengthens societies in transition, 
struggling for their political and legal independence. I discussed the 
cornerstone parameters of this principle, i.e., “willingness and ability,” delving 
into interpretations of scholars and of the ICC’s jurisdiction, and showed how 
this principle was incorporated both by the Rome Statute and by states that 
enacted universal jurisdiction laws. 
However, I argued that because the ICC’s jurisdiction is limited by various 
legal preconditions, it cannot always interfere to achieve global justice. After 
discussing the circumstances under which the ICC is unable to apply its 
jurisdiction, I suggested that in those situations, states that enact universal 
jurisdiction laws could take the ICC’s place. I showed that, like the ICC, those 
states also limited their universal jurisdiction laws through the principle of 
subsidiarity, and I illustrated the application of this principle in both the 
legislation and courts’ decisions in several prominent European states that have 
enacted and applied universal jurisdiction laws in several cases. 
Lastly, I examined the implications of the above conclusions to the Syrian 
case. Basing my analysis on a historical description of the establishment of the 
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Syrian state, the construction of Syrian society, and the development of the 
Syrian uprising (including a discussion of the motivations of its generators), I 
suggested that even though the Syrian society may be willing to conduct 
genuine criminal proceedings for the investigation and prosecution of the 
perpetrators of international core crimes, it will likely face conspicuous 
difficulties in performing this mission. I contended that the post-conflict Syrian 
legal system will most likely not be considered independent and hence will not 
be “willing and able” to conduct criminal procedures. Therefore, the 
international community will have room to apply universal jurisdiction after 
considering the parameters of complementarity—the willingness and ability of 
Syria to conduct those procedures by itself—and reaching the conclusion that 
the Syrian society does not live up to those parameters. 
The above notwithstanding, in practice, there is still doubt whether foreign 
national courts will realize their legal rights to adjudicate the perpetrators of 
international core crimes in Syria. International relations and political 
considerations may influence states’ decisions; hence, some states, desiring to 
preserve good relations with the new Syrian state, may abstain from meddling 
in Syria’s internal affairs,393 at least where Syria’s legal actions are in “a grey 
area” and especially if the international community is willing to tolerate the 
imperfect application of the rule of law in a state coming out of the turmoil of a 
revolution.394 While it is therefore impossible to predict how states will choose 
to apply the legal tool of universal jurisdiction they have developed and 
endorsed, it is nevertheless important to note the legality of its application. It is 
to be hoped that—at least in evident cases where impunity should be prevented 
and the rights and interests of victims should be secured—states will choose to 
apply universal jurisdiction laws to adjudicate perpetrators of international core 
crimes in Syria. 
 
 393 For similar considerations to avoid the application of universal jurisdiction, see Langer, supra note 28, 
at 2–5. 
 394 See Lama Abu Odeh, On Law and Revolution, 34 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 341, 344–45 (2013) (discussing 
the application of the rule of law in post-revolution Egypt). Cf. Cases and Situation: Libya, COAL. FOR INT’L 
CRIMINAL COURT, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=libya (last visited Nov. 5, 2015) (noting that the ICC exerted 
its jurisdiction over al-Gaddafi and claimed that Libya was unable to conduct a genuine investigation and 
prosecution). However, there is no guarantee that, if the case had been examined by states instead of the ICC, 
political considerations such as the ones discussed above would not have tilted the balance against applying 
universal jurisdiction. 
